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ABSTRACT
The role of dispositional optimism, confidence about experiencing favorable 
future outcomes, in processing and using health-threatening information in making 
attitudinal judgments about health-promotion behavior is underexplored. The valence- 
enhancement hypothesis posits that optimism enhances attitude change following both 
self-relevant positive and negative messages. We, however, predicted that optimism 
would increase elaborative processing of and buffer negative affective responses to self­
relevant, health-threatening information. In Study 1 (N  = 130), undergraduate students 
consuming caffeinated drinks regularly were presented with either negative or positive 
hypothetical cardiac consequences of caffeine consumption supported by either strong or 
weak evidence. Optimism predicted greater elaboration and less negative affect in 
response to the negative messages, regardless of argument strength. Optimism predicted 
greater negative thoughts about caffeine use following the negative message. Optimists’ 
greater negativity of thoughts about caffeine use and less negative affective response 
following the negative messages explained their subsequent attitudes toward caffeine use. 
These findings confirmed the beneficial roles of optimism in facilitating cognitive 
elaboration and buffering unpleasant emotional consequences of health-threatening 
messages, while increasing responsiveness to information about potential negative 
outcomes involving health. Study 2 (N  = 124) tested whether optimists’ attitudes toward 
a recommended health behavior following fear-arousing information varied as a function
of personal risk and response efficacy. Undergraduate students were presented with 
information about Repetitive Strain Injury (RSI) and received false feedback that they 
were either at high or low risk. Participants were then offered an RSI-prevention training 
program described as high, moderate, or low in effectiveness. Dispositional optimism 
predicted enhanced positive attitudes toward the highly effective training, both in the 
low- and especially in the high-risk condition. When the training was ineffective, 
optimism predicted greater counterarguments against the fear-arousing information about 
RSI. Optimists’ lower counterarguments against RSI explained their especially positive 
attitudes toward the highly effective training. Based on the patterns of optimists’ 
responsiveness to potential outcomes of performing recommended behaviors, we propose 
an extension of the valence-enhancement hypothesis: Optimistic beliefs not only promote 
attitude enhancements as a function of message valence, but also the valence of the 
consequences o f accepting the persuasive messages.
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Optimism, defined as generalized favorable expectancies regarding future events 
(Scheier & Carver, 1985), has been consensually identified as a crucial factor associated 
with people’s greater well-being and adaptive adjustments to various kinds of difficulties 
in life (e.g., Aspinwall & Taylor, 1992; Brissette, Scheier, & Carver, 2002; Carver et al., 
1993; Rasmussen, Wrosch, Scheier, & Carver, 2006; Scheier & Carver, 1985, 1992; 
Taylor et al., 1992). Dispositionally optimistic people, those who generally expect 
favorable future outcomes, typically report better mental and physical health (Robbins, 
Spence, & Clark, 1991; Ruthig, Chipperfield, Newall, Perry, & Hall, 2007; Scheier & 
Carver, 1992; Solberg Nes & Segerstrom, 2006; Taylor & Brown, 1988). Research has 
consistently found that optimists’ active and problem-focused coping styles, and, in some 
cases, lower use o f avoidant coping are responsible for these benefits (Aspinwall & 
Taylor, 1992; Brissette et al., 2002; Carver et al., 1993; Hatchett & Park, 2004; Nicholls, 
Polman, Levy, & Backhouse, 2008; Segerstrom, Taylor, Kemeny, & Fahey, 1998; Taylor 
et al., 1992; see also Aspinwall, Richter, & Hoffman, 2001; Solberg Nes & Segerstrom, 
2006; Taylor & Aspinwall, 1996; Wrosch & Scheier, 2003 for reviews).
Numerous studies have tested how optimists successfully cope with various types 
of stressors and threats (e.g., adjustment to college, Aspinwall & Taylor, 1992; sexism, 
Kaiser, Major, & McCoy, 2004; breast cancer treatment, Matthews & Cook, 2009). 
However, relatively few studies have focused on a critical earlier step in the coping
2process, namely, how optimists and pessimists differentially approach threatening 
information that may be important for taking precautions against potential threats. To 
date, optimists have been found to pay greater attention to and engage in elaborate 
processing of useful threatening information, while pessimists tend to avoid such 
information (Aspinwall & Brunhart, 1996, 2000; Kaiser et al., 2004). Moreover, a small 
amount of research has examined the ways in which optimists use negative (and positive) 
information in making judgments and in changing their attitudes and behaviors. Only 
one published study has directly investigated how dispositional optimism influenced 
people’s responses to persuasive messages (Geers, Handley, & McLarney, 2003). With 
this in mind, the aim of the current research was to elucidate the role optimism plays in 
persuasion. Specifically, we explored the way in which optimistic beliefs influenced 
cognitive and affective responses to, processing of, and attitudinal judgments in response 
to health-promotion recommendations following exposure to health-threatening 
persuasive messages. Doing so enhanced understanding of the possible pathways 
through which optimism has been linked to better health.
Optimists’ Processing of Threatening Information 
Research provides relatively consistent findings indicating that optimists pay 
greater attention to rather than avoid threatening information, especially self-relevant 
information (Abele & Gendolla, 2007; Aspinwall & Brunhart, 1996; Kaiser, Major, & 
McCoy, 2004). In a study by Aspinwall and Brunhart, participants high in health-related 
optimism who reported high vitamin use spent the longest time reading risk information 
when offered a chance to freely read neutral, benefit, and risk information about taking
vitamins, while optimists who were low vitamin users spent the least time reading such 
information. The results of a surprise recall test also paralleled these findings. Although 
Aspinwall and Brunhart did not find the same results for tanning behavior, they 
concluded that optimists’ attention to health information seems to be selective such that 
optimists paid attention to threatening information, especially when it was personally 
relevant (see also Aspinwall et al., 2001). In processing such information, research 
evidence suggested that optimists elaborated on health-threat information to a greater 
extent than did pessimists (Aspinwall & Brunhart, 2000). In a series of studies 
examining how optimists managed health-related risks, Aspinwall and Brunhart (2000) 
asked regular tanners to read risk, benefit, and neutral information pertaining to 
melanoma by using a menu on the computer screen to access the information.
Participants were then interviewed about their thoughts and feelings as they were 
navigating through the different kinds of information. It was found that dispositional 
optimists showed greater elaboration in processing the information regarding the risks of 
tanning only when they were told that melanoma was pervasive in their age group (as 
opposed to older people), and this elaboration did not entail arguing against the risks of 
tanning. This careful investigation of optimists’ processing of threatening information 
and the findings based on recall and recognition tasks of other studies (Abele &
Gendolla, 2007; Aspinwall & Brunhart, 1996; Kaiser et al., 2004) indicated that optimists 
effortfully scrutinize threatening information to a greater extent than do pessimists, 
especially when the information is potentially personally relevant.
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Optimists Reap Better Outcomes via Flexible Approach Coping 
Why do optimists face unpleasant information head on? Kaiser et al. (2004) 
demonstrated the role of optimistic beliefs in an initial step of coping, namely, coping 
appraisal, such that optimists appraised stressful stimuli as less threatening because they 
believed that they had greater coping resources to deal with them. Optimists thus fared 
better emotionally in the face of threatening information about prejudice against their 
own gender. Appraisal has been defined as cognitive interpretation of a potential stressor 
(Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). In conceptualizing stress appraisal processes, Lazarus and 
Folkman distinguished between primary and secondary appraisals. While primary 
appraisal refers to cognitive evaluation of how threatening the stressor is, secondary 
appraisal is a judgment o f what one can do to eliminate the stressor, which reflects 
whether the person perceives that he or she has adequate coping resources to deal with 
the stressor. Research documented that optimists believed that they had greater resources 
or capabilities to deal with stressors compared to pessimists (Chang, 1998; Kaiser et al., 
2004; Peacock & Wong, 1996).
Optimists’ belief that they have greater capabilities to deal with adversity leads 
them to confront rather than avoid the threat. A number of studies have consistently and 
uniformly found that optimists and pessimists cope differently with adversity such that 
optimists tend to engage in active, approach-oriented, and problem-focused coping aimed 
at eliminating stressors or the negative emotional consequences of facing stressors, while 
pessimists employ more avoidant strategies, such as denial of or withdrawal from 
stressors (Aspinwall & Taylor, 1992; Carver et al., 1993; Scheier et al., 1989; Scheier, 
Weintraub, & Carver, 1986; Solberg Nes & Segerstrom, 2006 for a review; see also
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Aspinwall & Taylor, 1997). In their recent meta-analysis, Solberg Nes and Segerstrom 
(2006) concluded that optimism was positively related to approach coping strategies 
aimed at managing challenges or the emotional consequences of dealing with challenges, 
and negatively linked to avoidance coping characterized by avoidance or withdrawal of 
effort in managing stressors.
Research suggests that in addition to employing approach coping, optimists adjust 
their coping strategies according to features of the situation. Scheier et al. (1986) 
investigated the differences between dispositional optimists and pessimists in using 
coping strategies. They asked participants to complete The Ways of Coping Checklist to 
indicate their attempts in coping with the most stressful situation they encountered in the 
last 2 months. The subjects also had to report their perceived degree of control over that 
situation. The results revealed that optimism was positively associated with problem- 
focused coping and positive reinterpretation especially when the situation was perceived 
controllable and with acceptance or resignation in uncontrollable situations. These 
findings suggested that optimistic people deal with a problem actively when they believe 
that it can be solved. However, in situations they do not believe to be amenable to 
problem-solving effort, optimists accept a defeat and do not turn to use maladaptive 
strategies such as denial, self-blame, or continued persistence.
In line with the findings o f Scheier et al. (1986), Aspinwall and Richter (1999) 
found that optimists displayed a potential to be flexible in pursuing their goal. Optimists 
and pessimists were asked to solve anagrams as part of a verbal intelligence test by 
rearranging groups of letters into meaningful words within a 20-minute time limit. In one 
condition, there were only seven unsolvable anagrams, but in the other condition there
5
6were two additional solvable sets of anagrams that were added as an alternative way to 
demonstrate high verbal intelligence. Highly optimistic participants disengaged from 
unsolvable anagrams almost 4 minutes sooner than their pessimistic peers when they had 
a choice to work on alternative anagrams, even though the disengagement was 
permanent. As a result, optimists solved more subsequent anagrams correctly. These 
findings suggested that optimists did not persist in working toward goals without 
reassessing the outcomes. If the current strategy did not appear to be effective in 
pursuing goals, optimists withdrew their effort and tried other strategies.
There is also evidence that optimists use their coping resources strategically. As 
discussed earlier, health-specific optimists in the Aspinwall and Brunhart (1996) study 
paid greater attention to health-threatening information only when it pertained to the self 
(i.e., when they were practicing the health behavior). Consistent with these findings, 
Abele and Gendolla (2007) found that optimists allocated processing resources according 
to personal relevance level. Optimists who were highly active exercisers showed better 
immediate and delayed recall of information about exercise compared to both optimists 
who did not exercise and to pessimists. In sum, besides potential flexibility in deploying 
coping strategies, optimists appeared to utilize their coping and processing resources 
selectively in attending to and processing health-related information in ways that enhance 
better outcomes.
Optimism and Persuasion
As optimists appear to selectively process self-relevant threatening information, 
Geers et al. (2003) hypothesized that they would be more responsive to level o f personal
7relevance and valence of persuasive information as compared to pessimists. Geers and 
colleagues expanded the role of optimism into persuasion contexts by proposing the 
valence-enhancement hypothesis, which predicts that optimism is associated with biased 
processing of both negative and positive persuasive messages that are self-relevant. That 
is, optimists will elaborate equally on positively- and negatively-framed messages. 
However, their processing is predicted to be biased such that optimism will enhance the 
effects of message valence, resulting in more positive responses to positive messages and 
more negative responses to negative messages. Geers et al.’s series o f experimental 
studies provided support for this hypothesis. Specifically, they found that when 
presented with a new tuition plan described to be either favorable (the new tuition plan 
would be a good opportunity for students to reduce their tuition by working part-time for 
the university) or unfavorable (the new tuition plan would be a burden for students 
because it requires all students to work part-time for the university), optimistic students 
were more persuaded by the positive message and less persuaded by the negative 
message (to agree with the new tuition plan), regardless of the argument quality of the 
messages. These findings suggest that optimists respond more to valence than to quality 
of the persuasive messages, leading to what Geers and colleagues called biased 
processing.
However, some important issues need to be considered before accepting the 
conclusion that optimists respond more to valence than to quality o f persuasive messages. 
First, the finding of Geers et al. (2003) that optimists failed to differentiate between 
strong and weak argument contradicts those of Aspinwall and Brunhart (1996, 2000), 
who found that optimists showed greater attention to and scrutiny of self-relevant health-
8risk information as compared to pessimists. Second, the topics of persuasion in the 
studies of Geers et al. (tuition and extra credit policies) are relatively uncontrollable 
events for students. School policies, especially tuition, are not likely determined by 
students’ opinions. This low personal control over the situation might foster decreased 
personal relevance of the persuasive message to students. A third, related point, is that 
because optimism is associated with active planning and initiation of action in order to 
resolve a problem, it is important that the protocol used to test responses to persuasive 
information allow for exertion of such efforts. In Geers and colleagues’ study, however, 
optimists appeared to have a relatively passive role in initiating changes in the new 
tuition plan even if they did not like the policy. Finally, if, as it is argued here, 
optimism’s active coping is particularly crucial when people are confronted with 
adversity, optimistic beliefs should be examined as a psychological resource in situations 
that pose a significant threat, such as when one confronts health-risk information (see 
Rasmussen et al., 2006). Although the negative message in the study of Geers and 
colleagues might be threatening to students as it could directly impact their school life, a 
threat to one’s physical health (e.g., risk for a disease) might be more threatening as it 
directly involves one’s well-being and can possibly impact every aspect of one’s life. 
Therefore, the present studies suggested that the role of optimism in persuasion should be 
tested as a personal resource, especially when individuals confront threatening persuasive 
information about their health.
Unanswered Questions About Optimism and Persuasion 
From the research literature discussed earlier, some issues related to the role of 
optimism in information processing and persuasion need to be carefully investigated. 
First and foremost, the role of optimism in responding to persuasive messages needs to be 
carefully tested. Examination of how optimistic beliefs influence attitude change in the 
context of health-risk communication will extend prior research, especially in regards to 
the influence of optimism on the processing of threatening persuasive messages. In the 
study of Geers et al. (2003), optimists exhibited similar patterns in their responses to both 
negative and positive messages about the new tuition policy— optimists favored the 
positive message and disfavored the negative one to a greater extent than did pessimists. 
However, for health behaviors for which people tend to defend their preferences in 
response to inconsistent or threatening information rather than to process it objectively 
(i.e., defensive biases, Das, de Wit & Stroebe, 2003; Liberman & Chaiken, 1992), 
optimism may affect this defensive response by helping individuals cope with such 
information more adaptively. This effect, however, may not be evident when individuals 
process preference-consistent information (i.e., positive messages) because such 
information supports rather than argues against their health behavior.
Second, while there is consistent evidence that optimists show less defensive 
biases toward threatening information, how optimists process positive or encouraging 
information has been a neglected issue. The only study that tested how optimists 
responded to personally relevant positive information found no relation between 
optimism and attention to information about benefits regarding health practices 
(Aspinwall & Brunhart, 1996). Because accepting good news without careful
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consideration could lead to harmful consequences, such as ignorance o f possible negative 
side effects, the current research aimed to examine how optimists and pessimists process 
positive information.
Third, due to seemingly inconsistent findings regarding the extent of cognitive 
elaboration on self-relevant information for optimists, the present study aimed to 
carefully explore this issue by including multiple measures of cognitive elaboration. In 
addition to a thought-listing task (Cacioppo & Petty, 1981) widely used to assess 
participant’s cognitive responses to persuasive messages, objective assessments of 
message elaboration, as well as self-ratings o f cognitive effort (used by Liberman & 
Chaiken,1992) were used to carefully examine the extensiveness of optimists’ and 
pessimists’ processing of negative and positive persuasive messages. These measures 
provided strong evidence o f  whether optimism facilitated approach-oriented rather than 
defensively avoidant processing o f  health-threatening information.
Finally, a study that assessed optimists’ and pessimists’ affective responses to 
threatening information showed that optimists expressed fewer depressed emotions as a 
result o f  exposure to information about sexism against their own gender group, due in 
part to perceived greater coping resources (Kaiser et al., 2004). However, the authors did 
not examine how the affective responses influenced optimists’ and pessimists’ 
subsequent judgments. Interestingly, affective responses to emotional persuasive 
messages have been found to influence attitude change by reflecting the impact o f  
cognitive factors in persuasion such as argument quality (Rosselli, Skelly, & Mackie, 
1995; Zuwerink & Devine, 1996). As self-relevant negative (threatening) and positive 
(encouraging) persuasive messages would potentially elicit emotional responses’ from
11
individuals, the current studies explored the role of affective responses to persuasive 
messages in optimists’ attitudinal judgments.
Moderating Role of Optimism in Processing 
Positive and Negative Messages 
Research on persuasion and attitude change has conceptualized the valence of 
persuasive messages in different ways. Geers et al. (2003) provided students with 
messages about a new tuition plan framed positively and negatively. Research on health 
promotion, on the other hand, has pervasively utilized fear appeals in persuading people 
to take care of their health. However, the most important concern in using negative (i.e., 
threatening) messages in health persuasion is that people tend to trivialize the seriousness 
of their health risks in order to avoid negative feelings and/or to protect their self-concept 
(Das et al., 2003; de Hoog, Stroebe, & de Wit, 2005; Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Jemmott, 
Ditto, & Croyle, 1986). Although motivation to carefully process aversive information is 
heightened by factors such as personal relevance, personal relevance only enhances 
elaboration of defensive processing (Kunda, 1990; Liberman & Chaiken, 1992). For 
instance, Liberman and Chaiken (1992) found that women who drank coffee regularly 
agreed less with and were more critical o f a message suggesting a link between caffeine 
and fibrocystic breast disease than a message disconfirming the link. In fear-arousing 
communications, high susceptibility to a health risk has been found to induce defensive 
motivation when the threat is severe, resulting in overly positive evaluations of action 
recommendations (Das et al., 2003; de Hoog et al., 2005). However, this positive bias is 
significantly minimized by an induction of positive mood that increases differentiation
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between strong and weak action recommendations (Das & Fennis, 2008). This finding 
indicates that having adequate personal resources is crucial for coping with threatening 
information. Optimism, which is associated with more adaptive coping, therefore was 
expected to foster less defensive processing of threatening health information.
Researchers studying responses to self-relevant health information have also 
found that people are generally less likely to question the validity o f positive or desirable 
information (Ditto & Lopez, 1992). However, we did not have a clear understanding of 
how optimism influenced this tendency. Because processing self-relevant positive 
information is less likely to be threatening to individuals, personal resources in coping, 
including optimism, are possibly not necessary and/or not involved. We predicted that 
the influence of optimism would be less pronounced when processing positive 
information compared to negative information. Both optimists and pessimists might 
accept good news indiscriminately (that is, without regard to message quality) because 
for optimists, such information would be consistent with their favorable future 
expectations of optimists, while for pessimists, such information could help repair 
negative moods and boost psychological resources.
Moderating Role of Optimism in Processing 
Strong and Weak Messages 
Message quality is an important determinant of attitude change in that it may 
intensify or mitigate cognitive and affective reactions to persuasive messages. 
Specifically, a message supported by strong evidence generally elicits greater agreement, 
while a weak message may lead to greater counterarguing and less successful persuasion.
In general, when the audience is motivated to think carefully about the topic, high 
personal relevance of the topic leads to more favorable responses to the strong message 
and less favorable attitudes toward the weak message (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979). In other 
words, responses to argument strength are good indices of the extent of an audience’s 
motivation and ability to process persuasive information. Individuals motivated to 
carefully and/or objectively scrutinize persuasive messages tend to show differentiation 
between strong and weak arguments, for example, of the action recommendations 
following a fear appeal (Das & Fennis, 2008; Das et al., 2003; de Hoog et al., 2005). 
Therefore, in addition to using a thought-listing task to assess extensiveness o f thoughts 
elicited by persuasive messages, manipulating argument strength in Study 1 allowed us to 
also test recipients’ motivation to accurately process messages.
In Das and colleagues’ studies on fear appeals, strong and weak arguments 
supporting an action recommendation (e.g., joining a stress management training) imply 
that the effectiveness of the recommended action is either assured or not. Study 2 
extended this test by varying the effectiveness of the action recommendation (e.g., high, 
moderate, or low) in order to test the moderating role of optimism. It was expected that 
optimists would show less defensiveness in dealing with fear-arousing information and 
therefore would be able to differentiate among the recommendations that vary in their 
effectiveness.
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Mediating Processes o f Attitude Change 
Cognitive elaborations have been viewed as a central mediating process of 
attitude change in most contemporary theories of persuasion (e.g., Elaboration Likelihood
Model, Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; the Heuristic-Systematic Model, Chaiken, 1980, 1987), 
which implies that cognitions are the most influential determinant of attitudes. However, 
not all persuasive messages are meant to directly influence cognitions related to attitude 
objects. Persuasion utilizing effects of moods works by eliciting feelings such as fear 
(Leventhal, 1971) in health communications (Stephenson & Witte, 1998; Witte, 1992, 
1994; Witte, Berkowitz, Cameron, & Lillie, 1998) or humor in consumer research (e.g., 
Chen, Grube, Bersamin, Waiters, & Keefe, 2005).
Some researchers emphasized the largely overlooked role o f affective responses 
on persuasion (e.g., Rosselli et al., 1995; Zuwerink & Devine, 1996). Rosselli et al. 
assessed cognitive and affective responses separately by asking participants to write 
down all the thoughts and feelings they had while reading either rational or emotional 
counterattitudinal messages that argued either in favor o f or against using animals in 
research. They found that emotional messages triggered greater affective rather than 
cognitive responses, and the valence of the affective responses depended upon argument 
quality, such that strong arguments elicited more positive emotional responses. Path 
analytic results showed that, in addition to cognitive responses, affective responses acted 
as a mediator of the relationship between argument quality and message acceptance in 
those who received emotional messages. Emotional responses to persuasive messages 
therefore may contribute to attitude change in addition to the more typically studied 
cognitive elaborations.
Considering the evidence that optimists show less negative emotional responses 
after processing self-threatening information concerning prejudice compared to 
pessimists due to their greater perceived coping resources (Kaiser et al., 2004), optimists’
14
affective responses may play a role in their attitudinal judgments through their emotional 
responses to a persuasive message. Specifically, because of optimists’ superior coping 
resources (i.e., belief that a health threat is manageable), they might feel less distressed 
after exposure to health-threatening persuasive information. Such affective response may 
signify that the health threat is less harmful, leading optimists to view the threat in a more 
positive light (e.g., smoking is not too bad). This idea is in line with the mood 
congruency framework (e.g., Bower, 1981; see Bower & Forgas, 2001 for a review), 
which posits that moods increase cognitive accessibility of mood-congruent materials in 
memory. In other words, optimists’ less negative mood may bring up less negative 
aspects of an attitude object, resulting in a mood-congruent judgment in favor of the 
object. Pessimists, whose emotional responses to threat are more negative, might be 
more likely to dwell on negative attributes of the attitude object and thus make negative 
attitudinal judgments about it.
Optimists’ perception of greater coping resources may also affect their attitude 
change cognitively. Health communication theories such as the Health Belief Model 
(HBM, Janz & Becker, 1984) and the Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM, Witte, 
1992) focus on recipients’ perceptions of health problems and actions to avert these 
problems as mediators of acceptance of the recommended action. The HBM, for 
instance, proposes that individuals will be most likely to adopt a suggested health 
behavior when four components are present: (a) individuals feel vulnerable to a threat 
(perceived susceptibility), (b) the threat is serious (perceived severity), (c) individuals 
believe that performing the recommended action is an effective means to avert the threat 
(perceived benefits), and (d) performing the recommended action involves low costs or
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negative consequences (perceived barriers). Similarly, the EPPM posits that if threat 
perceptions (susceptibility and severity) are high but not greater than efficacy perceptions 
(response efficacy and self-efficacy), individuals will be more likely to take a suggested 
action to manage the threat. However, if threat perceptions exceed perceived efficacy, 
people will instead focus on alleviating fearful feelings by adopting maladaptive 
behavior, such as avoiding thinking about the threat. Due to optimists’ superior coping 
resources, they might believe that the threat is under control, leading to increased 
perception of efficacy to approach and manage the threat. Consequently, optimists may 
face the potential health threat and change their attitude in a way that would reduce their 
likelihood of experiencing the negative health outcomes (e.g., changing attitudes toward 
the threatening attitude object to be less favorable).
In sum, we suspected that optimists’ affective and cognitive responses to 
persuasive messages could potentially have countervailing effects on subsequent 
attitudes. Due to the evidence that optimists’ attitude change is determined by cognitive 
responses to persuasive message (Gees at el., 2003) and that optimists effortfully process 
health-threatening information to a greater extent than do pessimists (Aspinwall & 
Brunhart, 1996, 2000), we predicted that optimists’ attitudes would be more strongly 
determined by their cognitive elaboration o f the health-threatening persuasive message 
than their affective responses to the health threat.
Overview of the Studies
The main purpose of the current studies was to examine the role of optimism in 
processing of persuasive messages and judgmental outcomes, including attitudes and
subsequent behavioral intentions, with respect to action recommendations in the context 
of health prevention. Studies 1 and 2 aimed to test 1) whether optimism moderated the 
effects of message valence, argument strength, and personal relevance on attitude change, 
and 2) If cognitive and affective responses to the persuasive messages explained the 
relationship between the predictors and attitude change. The proposed studies 
represented the first attempt to understand how optimism moderated judgmental 
responses to threatening persuasive messages in a health context and how both cognitive 
and affective responses to persuasive messages may explain the effects of optimism 
under different conditions.
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STUDY 1: OPTIMISM AND PROCESSING OF NEGATIVE 
AND POSITIVE PERSUASIVE MESSAGES
Study 1 was designed to provide an initial test of how optimism predicted 
processing of persuasive messages that varied in valence and argument strength (while 
personal relevance was high--the topic of persuasion was relevant to individuals’ own 
health behaviors), as well as to test the mediating role of both cognitive and affective 
responses in attitude change regarding health behavior. In this experimental study, 
participants received a persuasive message that either reinforced or argued against their 
current health behavior and was supported by either strong or weak evidence.
Hypotheses
First, if the valence-enhancement hypothesis of Geers et al. (2003) holds true that 
optimists respond more to message valence than argument quality, we should obtain 
greater unfavorable final attitudes in optimists who receive a negative message and 
greater favorable final attitudes in optimists who receive a positive message compared to 
pessimists, regardless of argument quality. However, if optimism facilitates less 
defensive or more objective processing of threatening information, optimists who receive 
the negative message would show greater difference in attitude change (toward the health 
behavior) between strong and weak threatening messages as compared to pessimists, by 
reporting greater attitude change when argument quality is strong than when it is weak.
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However, when the message encourages the health behavior they are practicing, optimists 
and pessimists should not differ in attitude change in the direction of agreement with the 
positive message, regardless of argument strength.
Second, in addition to cognitive responses, emotional responses to the message 
were predicted to mediate the effects of optimism, message valence, and argument 
strength on attitude change. Optimists were predicted to report less negative emotional 
responses to the strong negative message than pessimists, and these emotional responses 
were predicted to contribute to emotion-consistent attitudes. However, optimists and 
pessimists were expected to show the same degree of positive emotional responses to the 
positive message regardless of its argument strength because for optimists, positive 
messages would be consistent with their favorable expectancies, whereas for pessimists, 
such messages would potentially boost their psychological resources.
Method
Participants
Participants were 130 undergraduate students from the University of Utah who 
consumed caffeinated beverages regularly. The average age was 22.77 years and 60% of 
the sample were female. Participants received research participation credit in 
undergraduate psychology courses.
Design
Study 1 employed a dispositional optimism (continuous measure) x 2 (message 
valence: negative versus positive) x 2  (argument strength: strong versus weak) between-
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subjects design. All participants were randomly assigned to one of four cells.
Procedure
Participants completed the study in groups of up to four and were informed that 
the study involved assessing how laypeople or nonscientists understand medical 
information related to health issues. Participants first completed computerized measures 
of their daily consumption of caffeinated beverages (e.g., coffee, tea, caffeine-containing 
soda) and attitudes toward caffeine consumption (pretest) embedded in a general health 
survey that measured various health-related topics. Participants then completed a set of 
individual difference measures, including dispositional optimism and other individual 
differences related to optimism.
Next, participants were asked to read one of the four persuasive messages 
described as a medical report presenting a new finding in health research. The one-page 
persuasive message contained approximately 560 words with an introduction, research 
evidence, and a summary structured into six paragraphs (see Appendix A for examples of 
the persuasive messages). Participants received either a positive or negative message that 
contained either strong or weak evidence concerning the effects of caffeine on cardiac 
function. After reading the fictitious medical report, participants’ attitudes toward 
caffeine consumption (posttest) and intention to reduce/increase caffeinated drink intake 
were measured. Participants’ cognitive and affective responses to the message were then 
assessed. Finally, participants completed manipulation check items followed by a careful 
debriefing.
Measures and Materials 
Measures of Optimism and Other Individual Differences
Dispositional optimism. The Life Orientation Test-Revised (LOT-R, Scheier, 
Carver, & Bridges, 1994), consisting of six core and four filler items, was used to assess 
dispositional optimism (a = .81). The core items contain three positively-worded (e.g., 
“In uncertain times, I usually expect the best.”) and three negatively-worded items (e.g., I 
hardly ever expect things to go my way), each of which was rated on a 5-point Likert 
scale ranging from 1 (I disagree a lot) to 5 (I agree a lot). To calculate a dispositional 
optimism score, the three negatively-worded items were reverse scored and added to the 
three positively-worded items. The total score was averaged to create an optimism score, 
with higher numbers reflecting greater optimism.
Individual differences related to optimism. Several researchers (e.g., Benyamini 
& Roziner, 2008; Fontaine & Jones, 1997; Lancastle & Boivin, 2005; Marshall & Lang, 
1990; Smith, Pope, Rhodewalt, & Poulton, 1989) have argued that dispositional optimism 
is indistinguishable from individual difference constructs such as neuroticism, self­
esteem, positive affectivity, and self-mastery. We thus included measures o f five other 
individual differences that have been proposed to account for some of the benefits of 
optimism in the present study to assess the unique relation of optimism to persuasion 
outcomes. Specifically, neuroticism (12-item NEO-FFI, Costa & McCrae, 1992; a =
.82), self-mastery (Pearlin & Schooler, 1978; a = .72), positive affectivity (10-item 
PANAS-P, Watson & Clark, 1994; a = .87), self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1965; a = .90), and 
naive optimism (a 15-item scale, Epstein & Meier, 1989; a = .83) were measured. The 
items in each measure were averaged to form scales.
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Manipulations of Predictors
Message valence. Half o f the participants were assigned to read a medical report 
briefly describing three fictitious new research studies that found a negative impact of 
caffeine consumption on heart valve function (negative message condition) with a 
recommendation to decrease caffeine consumption. The other half read a fictitious 
medical report containing three new studies suggesting a benefit of caffeine consumption 
in facilitating the function of heart valves (positive message condition) with a 
recommendation to increase caffeine consumption. To increase the credibility and 
personal relevance of the persuasive message, the medical report also contained a picture 
of a young adult (male for male participants, female for female participants). In the 
negative message condition, the model clearly displayed pain and suffering from heart 
problems and held a caffeinated drink in one hand, whereas in the positive message 
condition, the same model expressed pleasant emotions while holding the same 
caffeinated drink.
Argument strength. The argument strength manipulation (adapted from Liberman 
& Chaiken, 1992) was orthogonal to the message valence manipulation. In the strong 
argument condition, the medical report contained research that had no methodological 
flaws and had consistent results among the three studies regarding the effects of caffeine 
on heart valve function. In the weak argument condition, the reported studies contained 
methodological flaws or weaknesses and inconsistent findings about the effects of 
caffeine on heart valve function.
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Main Outcomes
Attitudes toward caffeine consumption. To measure attitudes concerning caffeine 
consumption, participants were asked to indicate how good, bad, beneficial, harmful, and 
healthy they thought caffeine consumption was (adapted from Raghunathan & Trope, 
2002) on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much). The same set of questions was used 
to assess participants’ attitudes both pretest and posttest. Responses from all five items 
(a = . 8 6  for the pretest and . 8 8  for the posttest) were averaged to create a baseline and a 
postmessage attitude index.
Intention to change caffeine consumption. Following the posttest measure of 
attitude, participants were asked to indicate if they should, will try to, and are going to 
decrease/increase caffeine consumption using question such as “How likely is it that you 
will try to decrease/increase your caffeine consumption in the next month?” on a scale of 
1 (not at all) to 9 (very likely; Raghunathan & Trope, 2002). The three intention items 
formed a highly reliable measure (a = .94).
Cognitive and Affective Reponses to the Persuasive Messages
Thought-and-feeling listing tasks. Immediately after filling out the measure of 
attitudes and intention, participants were asked to type in any and all reactions they had 
while reading the message, including thoughts and feelings, regardless o f relevance to the 
message. The instructions were adapted from Rosselli et al. (1995) who modified the 
instructions of traditional thought-listing tasks to include report of affective responses.
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Extensiveness of Message Processing
Self-rating of cognitive effort. To measure participants’ cognitive effort in 
processing the message, they were asked to indicate how much effort they put into trying 
to understand and think about the content of the medical report on a single item measure 
using a scale from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much; adapted from Liberman & Chaiken, 
1992).
Objective rating of message scrutiny. To assess the extent of message processing 
from participants’ cognitive and affective responses to the thought-and-feeling listing 
tasks, two judges independently evaluated the content of participants’ responses in terms 
of how elaborate responses were with regard to caffeine consumption on a scale of 1 
(lowest message elaboration) to 10 (highest message elaboration). The judges were 




Message valence. Three questions (e.g., How threatening did you find the 
medical report to be for you?, with 1= not at all, 9 = very much) were used to check the 
message valence manipulation. A two-way Message Valence x Argument Strength 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) indicated a significant main effect of message valence,
(F (1, 126) = 310.72, p  < .001), such that participants in the negative message condition 
(M = 6.78, SD = 1.67) had higher ratings of message negativity than those in the positive 
message condition (M = 2.11, SD = 1.44). However, there was also a significant
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interaction between message valence and argument strength (F (1, 126) = 6.29, p  < .05) 
indicating that participants rated strong negative messages (M  = 7.44, SD = 1.35) as more 
negative than weak negative messages (M = 5.96, SD = 1.67), while there was no 
difference in rating of message negativity between strong positive (M = 2.20, SD = 1.68), 
and weak positive messages (M = 2.02, SD = 1.20).
Argument strength. Participants were asked to rate how convincing, strong, and 
persuasive the message was (e.g., “How convincing did you find the medical report to 
be?) on a 9-point scale (1= not at all, 9 = very much). A two-way ANOVA indicated a 
significant main effect of argument strength (F  (1, 126) = 45.34, p  < .001) on 
participants’ rating of argument strength, suggesting that participants who received the 
strong argument (M = 5.01, SD = 2.16) rated the message as stronger that those who 
received the weak argument (M  = 3.75, SD = 1.70). There was also a significant main 
effect of message valence (F  (1, 126) = 10.96, p  = .001) suggesting that participants in 
the negative message condition (M = 4.98, SD = 1.92) rated the message as stronger than 
did those in the positive message condition (M  = 3.79, SD = 2.00). There was no 
interaction between argument strength and message valence.
Descriptive Statistics
Correlations among optimism, the other individual difference measures, and the 




Correlations and Means o f Optimism, Related Individual Differences, and Attitudes 
Toward and Intention to Change Caffeine Consumption.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Dispositional optimism -- .08 - . 0 2 .08 - 5 4 *** 5 9 *** .64*** .56*** .42***
2. Baseline attitude -- 4 7 *** -.07 -.16 .16 .17+ .06 -.17+
3. Postattitude toward 
caffeine consumption
--
.40*** .15 . 0 2 .03 -.04 -.04
4. Intention to change 
caffeine consumption
-- -.15 .2 0 * . 1 1 . 1 2 -.09
5. Neuroticism -- -.44*** -.70*** .46*** .2 0 *
6 . Self-mastery -- .59*** .49*** .2 1 *
7. Self-esteem -- .61*** .34***
8 . Positive affectivity -- .46***
9. Naive optimism --
M 3.76 3.94 4.31 3.69 2.77 5.57 3.94 3.53 3.59
SD 0.73 1.25 1.37 2.48 0.71 0.81 0.74 0.60 0.49
Range of Score 1-5 1-9 1-9 1-9 1-5 1-7 1-5 1-5 1-5
N 126 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130
Note. +p < .06. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Primary Results
Attitude Change and Intentions
To test the main predictions for whether optimism, message valence, and 
argument strength predicted attitude change and intention to change caffeine 
consumption behavior, hierarchical regression analyses were performed. In the first step, 
we controlled for age, gender, and baseline attitude for the analyses predicting 
postmessage attitudes. Next, the main effects of dispositional optimism (centered), 
message valence (dummy coded), argument strength (dummy coded), and amount of 
caffeine consumption (centered) were entered in Step 2, followed by the two-way
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interaction terms between these variables in Step 3. Step 4 involved all three-way 
interaction terms, following by the four-way Dispositional Optimism x Message Valence 
x Argument Strength x Amount o f Caffeine Consumption interaction entered at the last 
step. Regression slopes (simple slopes) and plots were calculated according to 
procedures outlined by Aiken and West (1991) for interpretation of interaction effects. 
Participants whose optimism scores were 1 SD below the mean were labeled as “low 
optimism,” and those whose optimism scores were 1 SD above the mean were 
categorized as “high optimism . ” 1 The same criterion applied to categorizing high and 
low caffeine consumption.
Amount of caffeine use. Participants reported consuming an average of 1.85 
servings of caffeinated drinks per day (SD = 1.20). The minimum reported consumption 
was a half serving and the maximum was 10 servings per day. We first examined 
whether the effects o f the main predictors were moderated by differences in participants’ 
baseline caffeine use. When the amount of caffeine consumption and its associated 
interactions were added to the regression analyses with the main predictors as described 
above, neither the main effect nor the interaction effects involving caffeine use was 
significant in predicting postmessage attitudes or intention. As a result, the caffeine use 
measure was excluded from further analysis.
Attitudes toward caffeine consumption. At baseline, participants reported 
somewhat negative attitudes toward caffeine consumption (M  = 3.94, SD = 1.25), which 
were significantly below the midpoint of the scale (5, on the scale of 1 to 9; t (129) =
1 Low dispositional optimists in Study 1 were those whose scores were equal to or lower than 3.03 on a 
scale from 1-5 of the LOT-R, whereas high dispositional optimists were those whose scores were equal to 
or greater than 4.49. Therefore, low optimists (i.e., pessimists) in this sample were those who indicated that 
they neither agreed nor disagreed with the items measuring optimism.
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9.67, p  < .001). Postmessage attitude was slightly more negative for the negative 
message condition (M = 3.75, SD = 1.34), and more positive for the positive message 
condition (M = 4.92, SD = 1.13).
When dispositional optimism, message valence, and argument strength were 
entered as predictors of attitude change (controlling for age, gender, and baseline 
attitudes), the regression analysis yielded three significant steps. As shown in Table 2, 
the main effects of age (fi = -.18, p  < .05) and baseline attitudes (fi = .48, p  < .001) were 
significant, F  (3,122) = 13.62, p  < .001, indicating that younger participants and those 
with more positive baseline attitudes toward caffeine use showed more favorable 
postmessage attitudes toward caffeine consumption. In Step 2, AR2  = .26, AF (3,119) = 
20.94, p  < .001, there was a significant main effect of message valence (fi = .52, p  < 
.0 0 1 ), such that participants who read the positive message were more likely to show 
favorable postmessage attitudes toward caffeine consumption than those who read the 
negative message. There was also a significant main effect of argument strength (fi = - 
13, p  < .05), indicating that exposure to the weak argument predicted more favorable 
postmessage attitudes toward caffeine use than exposure to the strong argument. Lastly, 
the third step of the analysis was significant, AR2  = .05, AF (3,116) = 4.78, p  < .01, and 
yielded a significant two-way Dispositional Optimism x Message Valence interaction (fi 
= .2 2 , p  < .01). As shown in Figure 1, the relation of dispositional optimism to attitude 
change was significantly moderated by message valence. Specifically, dispositional 
optimism predicted marginally less favorable attitudes toward caffeine use among 
participants who read the passage about the negative effect of caffeine on heart valve 
function (slope = -0.33, t (122) = -1.74, p  = .084). However, optimism was not
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Standardized Regression Coefficients (with AR2) From Hierarchical Regression Analyses 
With Dispositional Optimism, Message Valence, and Argument Strength Predicting 




AR2 p A R 2 P
Step 1 25*** . 0 1
Age -.18* - . 0 2
Gender . 0 1 . 1 0
Baseline attitude .48*** -.08
Step 2 .26*** .38***
Age - . 0 2 - . 2 0
Gender .03 .06
Baseline attitude .56*** -.17*
Dispositional optimism . 0 2 . 1 1
Message valence .52*** -.61***




Age . 0 1 - . 2 1
Gender . 0 0 .08
Baseline attitude .53*** -.15*
Dispositional optimism -.17 .23+
Message valence .36*** -.46***
Argument strength - 2 9 *** .25*
Dispositional optimism x Message valence **2.2 - . 1 0
Dispositional optimism x Argument strength .06 -.06
Message valence x Argument strength .26* -.23+
Step 4 . 0 0 . 0 0
Age . 0 0 **.21-
Gender . 0 0 .08
Baseline attitude .53*** -.15*
Dispositional optimism - . 2 0 .24
Message valence .36*** -.46***
Argument strength -.30*** *5.2
Dispositional optimism x Message valence .27* - . 1 2
Dispositional optimism x Argument strength . 1 1 -.09
Message valence x Argument strength .26* -.23+
Dispositional optimism x Message valence x
-.07 03Argument strength
Note. + p < .07. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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•  “  Positive Message 
■^-Negative Message
Figure 1. Relation of dispositional optimism to predicted postmessage attitudes toward 
caffeine consumption as a function of message valence, controlling for baseline attitude.
Note: Higher numbers indicate more favorable attitudes.
significantly related to more favorable postmessage attitudes toward caffeine 
consumption among participants who read about the positive effects of caffeine on heart 
valve function (slope = 0.41, t (122) = 1.45, p  < .16). Interestingly, this interaction 
pattern is consistent with the valence-enhancement hypothesis, although it should be 
noted that neither of the slopes was significantly different from zero (the significant 
interaction result, however, indicated that the slopes were not parallel).
Intentions to change caffeine consumption. Participants’ intentions to decrease 
(in the negative message condition) or increase (in the positive message condition) 
caffeine consumption in the next month were subjected to similar hierarchical regression 
analyses used for predicting attitude change (excluding baseline attitude). As shown in 
Table 2, a significant second step, AR2  = .38, AF (3,119) = 24.95, p  < .001, indicated a 
















consumers who read about the negative effects of caffeine consumption on heart valve 
function showed stronger intentions to reduce their caffeine consumption compared to 
caffeine consumers who read about the positive effects of caffeine. However, 
dispositional optimism did not predict intention to change caffeine consumption 
behavior, nor did it interact with other predictors in doing so. In summary, in predicting 
postmessage attitudes, the results were consistent with the valence-enhancement 
hypothesis such that dispositional optimism enhanced individuals’ responses to the 
valence of the self-relevant persuasive message. We did not obtain evidence to support 
our hypothesis that optimism would facilitate differentiation between strong and weak 
arguments, as optimists did not appear to respond to the quality o f the persuasive 
messages about health in making attitudinal judgments.
Cognitive and Affective Responses to the Persuasive Messages
Two independent raters coded the thoughts and feelings each participant listed in 
the thought-and-feeling listing tasks. First, a distinction between whether a particular 
response was cognitive or affective was made by two judges who were unaware of 
participants’ experimental condition.
Affective responses were then categorized into three mutually exclusive 
categories: positive affective responses ("I feel calm”), negative affective responses (“I ’m 
worried about my risk [for heart valve malfunction]"), and neutral feelings (“surprised" ; 
see Appendix B for frequency of each category). Following Rosselli et al. (1995), who 
distinguished between cognitive and affective responses, a negative affective response
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index was created by subtracting the number of positive affective responses from the 
number of negative affective responses of each participant.
Cognitive thoughts listed by participants were categorized into seven mutually 
exclusive categories: positive thoughts regarding caffeine use (e.g., “I  felt better about 
drinking coffee every morning"), negative thoughts regarding caffeine use (“Caffeine can 
only damage your body""), thoughts supporting the message argument (“I  appreciated the 
mention that confounding variables were accountedfor in the description o f the study""), 
thoughts criticizing the message argument (“The sample groups were too small and 
biased to find  any useful evidence"), thoughts indicating defensive responses to the 
message such as denial or reactance (“I  didn’t really want to believe the article because I  
consume at least two caffeinated beverages per day and would like for that not to affect 
my heart"), thoughts indicating desire for further information (“ Wanting to learn more 
about how it is goodfor your health""), and unrelated thoughts (see Appendix B for 
frequency of each category). Agreement between the two judges was 89.21%. Coding 
disagreements were resolved through discussion. Because optimism was expected to 
affect valence of cognitive responses (Geers et al., 2003), a proportion of negative 
thoughts about caffeine use index and a proportion of positive thoughts about caffeine 
use index were then created by dividing the number of each kind of thought by the 
number of total thoughts listed by each participant (Petty, Shumann, Richman, & 
Strathman, 1993).
It should be noted that the negative affective response index was not correlated 
with the proportion of negative thought about caffeine use index (r = -. 14, p  > .05) or 
with the proportion of positive thought about caffeine use index (r = -.13, p  > .05). Each
of the cognitive and affective indices was then subjected to hierarchical regressions 
similar to those used in the primary analyses.
Proportion of negative thought about caffeine use index. The analysis revealed a 
significant main effect of baseline attitude (ft = -.26, p  < .01) in the first step, AR2  = .09, 
AF (3,112) = 4.14, p  < .01, such that more favorable baseline attitudes toward caffeine 
use predicted lower proportion of negative thoughts about caffeine use after reading the 
passage. In Step 2, AR2  = .06, AF (3,119) = 2.75,p  < .05, there was a main effect of 
message valence (ft = -.19, p  < .05), indicating that exposure to the negative message 
predicted greater proportion of negative thoughts about caffeine use. Interestingly, in 
Step 3, AR2  = .13, AF (3,116) = 7.14, p  < .001, there was a significant Dispositional 
Optimism x Message Valence interaction in the third step (ft = -.41 , p  < .001). As shown 
in Figure 2, dispositional optimism significantly predicted a greater proportion of 
negative thoughts about caffeine use in response to the negative message (slope = 0 .2 0 , t 
(122) = 3.33, p  < .002), but did not predict the proportion of such thoughts in response to 
the positive message (slope = -0.10, t (122) = -1.43, p  < .16). These results indicated that 
dispositional optimists listed a greater proportion of negative thoughts about caffeine use 
after exposure to negative message, but did not differ from pessimists in the proportion of 
such thoughts following the positive message.
Proportion of positive thought about caffeine use index. The analyses yielded no 
significant results, indicating that dispositional optimism was not a significant predictor 
of the positivity o f thoughts regarding caffeine use in response to either the positive or 
the negative message.







Figure 2. Relation of dispositional optimism to predicted proportion of negative thought 
about caffeine consumption index as a function of message valence.
Note. Higher numbers indicate greater proportion of negative thoughts.
AR2  = .07, AF (3,119) = 2.92, p  < .05, with a main effect of message valence (fi = -.26, p
< .01), indicating that negative message predicted greater negative affect. This effect, 
however, was qualified by a significant Dispositional Optimism x Message Valence 
interaction (fi = .24,p  < .05) in Step 3, AR2  = .07, AF (3,116) = 3.03,p  < .05. As depicted 
in Figure 3, dispositional optimism significantly predicted less negative affective 
responses to the negative message (slope = -1.11, t (122) = -2.92, p  < .003), but did not 
predict negative affective responses to the positive message (slope = -0.12, t < 1). In 
sum, as we hypothesized, dispositional optimists showed a lower ratio of negative affect 
in response to the negative message, but were not different from pessimists in negative 
affect in response to the positive message . 2
2 Although we followed Roselli et al. (1995) in creating the negative affective response index, we tested 
whether the number of negative affective response alone (without subtraction of positive affective 











Figure 3. Relation of dispositional optimism to predicted negative affective response 
index as a function of message valence.
Mediation Analyses
The proportion of negative thoughts about caffeine use and the negative affective 
response indices were then used to test the prediction that not only cognitive, but also 
affective responses to the persuasive message would explain the moderating effects of 
optimism on attitude change. Mediated moderation analyses were performed using the 
bootstrapping procedure described by Preacher and Hayes (2008) for estimating direct 
and indirect effects with multiple mediators. The bootstrapping method involved 
repeatedly sampling from the data set, estimating the indirect effect of each mediator in 
each resampled data set, and constructing confidence intervals for the indirect effect. 
Postmessage attitudes toward caffeine use were entered as the outcome variable, the 
Dispositional Optimism x Message Valence interaction was entered as a predictor
number of negative affective responses yielded similar results. Specifically, dispositional optimists listed a 
lower number of negative affective responses to the negative messages (slope = -1.12, t (126) = -2.95, p < 
.004), but did not differ from pessimists in listing negative affects in response to the positive messages 
(slope = -0.29, t < 1). Optimism, however, did not predict number of positive affective responses.
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(controlling for dispositional optimism, message valence, and baseline attitudes), and the 
proportion of negative thought about caffeine use and the negative affective response 
indices were entered as potential mediators in the SPSS macro for multiple mediators 
created by Preacher and Hayes (http://www.comm.ohio-state.edu/ahayes/macros.htm).
As shown in Table 3, bootstrap results based on 5,000 samples indicated, with 95% 
confidence, that the total indirect effect of Dispositional Optimism x Message Valence 
interaction on postmessage attitudes toward caffeine consumption through the two 
mediators (the sum of each specific indirect effect) was not significantly different from 
zero, with a point estimate o f .02 (the bootstrap confidence interval is -.2027 to .2872 and 
thus contained zero). The direct effect of Dispositional Optimism x Message Valence 
interaction thus remained significant (unstandardized regression coefficient of direct 
effect = .63,p  < .05). However, as discussed in Preacher and Hayes (2008), a significant 
total indirect effect is not required for testing specific indirect effects; therefore, the 
specific indirect effects through the proportion of negative thought and the negative 
affective response indices were examined next. The specific indirect effects of each 
proposed mediator indicated that both the proportion of negative thought index, with a 
point estimate of .1862 and a 95% bias-corrected and accelerated confidence interval 
(BCa 95% CI o f .0335 to.4160), and the negative affective response index, with a point 
estimate of -.1626 and a BCa 95% CI of -.3447 to -.0347,3 were significant unique 
mediators. A contrast test of the indirect effects showed that the specific indirect effect
3 The mediation analysis using number of negative affective responses alone (without subtraction of 
positive affective responses) yielded similar results to the negative affective response index, such that 
number of negative affective responses significantly mediated the relationship between the Dispositional 
Optimism x Message Valence interaction on final attitudes toward caffeine use with a point estimate of - 
. 1278 (BCa 95% CI of -.3233 to -.0314). The effect was also in the same direction as the negative affective 
response index.
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Multiple Mediation o f the Effect o f Dispositional Optimism x Message Valence 
Interaction on Postmessage Attitudes Toward Caffeine Consumption Through the 
Proportion o f Negative Thought About Caffeine Consumption and the Negative Affective 
Response Indices.




Proportion of negative thought index .1862 .0335 .4160
Negative affective response index -.1626 -.3447 -.0347
Total .0236 -.2027 .2872
Contrast
Proportion of negative thought index 
vs. negative affective response index .3488 .1322 .6278
Note: Bootstrap was based on 5,000 samples. N  = 126. BCa 95% CI = 95% bias-corrected and 
accelerated confidence interval. Confidence intervals not including 0 indicate significant results.
through the proportion of negative thoughts index was larger than that through the 
negative affective response index, with a BCa 95% CI of .1322 to .6278. The overall 
model that included both the predictor (Dispositional Optimism x Message Valence) and 
the two mediators (the proportion of negative thought and the negative affective response 
indices) in predicting postmessage attitudes toward caffeine consumption was significant, 
R 2  = .58, F  (6,119) = 26.94,p  <.001.
To summarize, the mediation analyses demonstrated that compared to pessimists, 
dispositional optimists’ less favorable attitudes toward caffeine use after exposure to a 
message about the harmful effects of caffeine were based on the proportion of negative 
thoughts about caffeine use and negative affect in response to the persuasive message, 
such that a higher proportion o f negative thoughts and greater negative affective response 
predicted less favorable attitudes toward caffeine use. Interestingly, these two 
mediational pathways operated in different directions in predicting optimists’ resulting
attitudes. First, optimists listed fewer negative affective responses after exposure to the 
message about the harmful effects of caffeine use, and fewer negative affective responses 
predicted more favorable attitudes toward caffeine use. However, optimists generated a 
greater number of negative thoughts concerning caffeine use, and this greater proportion 
of negative thoughts predicted less favorable attitudes toward caffeine consumption. 
Although these two effects were in opposing directions, the effect size of the proportion 
of negative thoughts about caffeine use was greater than that of the negative affective 
response. Optimists’ attitudes toward caffeine use thus were more determined by their 
negative thoughts about caffeine, than by their negative affective responses.
Consequently, optimists showed somewhat less favorable attitudes toward caffeine use as 
compared to pessimists following a negative message. These findings supported our 
hypothesis that affective responses, in this case negative ones, to persuasive messages 
regarding health risks mediated the interactive effect of optimism and message valence in 
predicting postmessage attitude independently from the mediating effect of cognitive 
response.
Extensiveness of Message Processing
It was hypothesized that optimists would benefit from their positive outcome 
expectancies and be more likely to process the threatening persuasive message carefully 
and less defensively. In addition to the cognitive elaboration indices from the open- 
ended measure of the thought-and-feeling listing tasks, participants’ ratings o f their own 
cognitive effort and the judges’ evaluation of participants’ message elaboration were 
examined as indicators of optimists’ extensiveness of message processing.
38
Self-rating of cognitive effort. In general, participants reported putting high effort 
into processing the passage (M = 7.12, SD = 1.51, on a scale from 1 to 9). Participants’ 
rating of their degree of cognitive effort used in thinking about the content of the medical 
report was subjected to primary hierarchical regression analyses. The results revealed a 
marginally significant second step, AR2  = .06, AF (3,119) = 2.46, p  = .066, containing a 
main effect o f dispositional optimism (fi = .22, p  < .05). These results suggested that 
optimists reported greater effort in thinking about and trying to understand the passage 
describing the health-related consequences o f caffeine consumption than did pessimists, 
regardless of the valence and argument strength of the message to which they were 
exposed.
Objective rating of message scrutiny. Overall, participants were rated as showing 
relatively low elaboration when processing the medical report (M  = 4.25, SD = 1.69, on a 
scale from 1 to 10). The agreement of the two judges was 85.38%, with scores that were 
within one point or less o f each other considered as agreeing. As shown in Figure 4, 
when the objective evaluation of participants’ message scrutiny was subjected to the 
primary hierarchical regression analyses (controlling for baseline attitude), there was a 
marginally significant Step 2, AR2  = .06, AF (3,116) = 2.55, p  = .059, containing a 
significant Dispositional Optimism x Message Valence interaction (fi = -.28, p  < .05), 
indicating that dispositional optimists elaborated on the negative message to a greater 
extent than did their pessimistic counterparts (slope = 0.92, t (122) = 2.63, p  < .01), but 
did not differ from the pessimists in their elaboration on the positive messages (slope = - 
0.11, t < 1). No other significant results were observed. Overall, the results from three 
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Figure 4. Relation of dispositional optimism to predicted objective rating of message 
elaboration as a function of message valence.
Note: Higher numbers indicate greater message elaboration on a scale of 1 to 10.
of cognitive effort, and judges’ ratings of message elaboration -- were consistent in 
indicating that optimists effortfully processed the message, especially the negative one, to 
a greater extent than did pessimists.
Additional Analyses on Other Thought Indices
We tested whether optimism was associated with any of the other indices derived 
from the thought-and-feeling listing tasks using the same hierarchical regression analysis 
as the primary one. The thought indices tested here were not part of the proportion of 
negative thought about caffeine use index used in the mediation analyses (See examples 
of thoughts for each category in Appendix B). We obtained a significant result in 
predicting number of thoughts criticizing the message argument about the effects of 
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b. Positive message condition.
Figure 5. Relation of dispositional optimism to predicted number of thoughts refuting 
the message argument, as a function of argument strength, in the negative and positive 
message conditions.
Note: Higher numbers indicate greater number of thoughts.
of the analysis, AR2  = .06, AF (1,115) = 7.69, p  < .0 1 , there was a significant three-way 
Dispositional Optimism x Message Valence x Argument Strength interaction (fi = .42, p
< .0 1 ) in predicting number of thoughts refuting the research evidence cited in the 
persuasive messages, such that dispositional optimism significantly predicted greater 
number of the thoughts criticizing the strong (slope = 0.99, t (118) = 3.09,p  < .003), but 
not the weak positive message (slope = -0.26, t (118) = -1.00, p  < .32). Dispositional 
optimism did not predict number of thoughts refuting the weak (slope = 0 . 1 2 , t < 1 ) or 
strong evidence (slope = -0.14, t < 1) cited in the negative message. To summarize, 
instead of showing greater message acceptance, optimists were more likely than 
pessimists to question the validity o f the strong evidence that provided support for the 
healthfulness of their current behavior.
Tests of Confounding Effects of Other Individual Differences
Neuroticism, trait self-esteem, self-mastery, and trait positive affectivity. To 
examine whether other individual differences known to be correlated with dispositional 
optimism were responsible for the predictive effects obtained for attitudes and behavioral 
intentions, each individual difference and its interaction terms were added to the primary 
hierarchical regression analyses as simultaneous predictors with dispositional optimism 
in predicting postmessage attitude toward caffeine use. With neuroticism, self-mastery, 
trait self-esteem, or trait positive affectivity in the equations, the Dispositional Optimism 
x Message Valence effect remained significant and virtually equivalent in magnitude in
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all analyses, suggesting that these individual differences did not confound the effects of 
dispositional optimism reported in the primary analyses . 4
Naive optimism. Unlike the other individual differences, when the effects of 
naive optimism were statistically controlled, the patterns of the moderating effects of 
dispositional optimism on postmessage attitudes toward caffeine use were altered. 
Specifically, when naive optimism was added to the model as a simultaneous predictor, 
the Dispositional Optimism x Message Valence interaction in predicting postmessage 
attitudes toward caffeine use became nonsignificant (dropping from ft = .2 2 , p  < .0 1 to ft = 
13, p  < .19). However, the Dispositional Optimism x Argument Strength interaction 
instead became significant (ft = .23, p  < .05). As shown in Figure 6 , with naive optimism 
in the same model, dispositional optimism significantly predicted less favorable attitudes 
toward caffeine consumption following the weak (slope = -.38, t (122) = -2.00, p  < .05), 
but not strong argument (slope = 0.27, t (122) = 1.23, p  < .23). Interestingly, the Naive 
Optimism x Message Valence (ft = .22, p  < .05) and Naive Optimism x Argument 
Strength (ft = -.32, p  = .001) interactions were also significant. Simple slope testing, 
shown in Figures 7 and 8 , indicated that naive optimism predicted more favorable 
attitudes toward caffeine consumption following the positive message (slope = .96, t 
(126) = 2.67, p  < .01), but did not predict such attitudes following the negative message 
(slope = .09, t <1). In addition, naive optimism predicted significantly less favorable 
attitudes toward caffeine consumption when the message was strong (slope = -1.28, t 
(126) = -3.56, p  < .001), but not when it was weak (slope = .09, t <1).
4 When each individual difference was considered as a predictor of postmessage attitudes toward caffeine 
consumption (with dispositional optimism in the same model), there was a significant main effect of 
neuroticism (ft = .17, p < .05), such that higher neuroticism predicted more favorable postmessage attitudes 
toward caffeine use. There were no significant interactions involving neuroticism. No other significant 









Figure 6 . Relation of dispositional optimism to predicted postmessage attitudes toward 
caffeine consumption, as a function of argument strength, with naive optimism as a 
simultaneous predictor.
Note: Higher numbers indicate greater favorable attitudes.
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Figure 7. Relation of naive optimism to predicted postmessage attitudes toward caffeine 
consumption as a function of message valence with dispositional optimism as a 
simultaneous predictor.


















Figure 8 . Relation o f naive optimism to predicted postmessage attitudes toward caffeine 
consumption as a function of argument strength with dispositional optimism as a 
simultaneous predictor.
Note: Higher numbers indicate greater favorable attitudes.
To summarize, with naive optimism and its interactions in the same model, the 
effect of Dispositional Optimism x Message Valence became nonsignificant, while the 
Dispositional Optimism x Argument Strength interaction became significant such that 
optimists showed less favorable attitudes toward caffeine use when the message was 
weak. Two interactions involving naive optimism were significant indicating that naive 
optimists showed more favorable attitudes toward caffeine use when the message 
presented the benefits of caffeine, but showed less favorable attitudes when the message 
was supported by strong evidence. Therefore, although naive optimism was significant in 
predicting postmessage attitudes toward caffeine use, it did not show the same pattern of 
results as dispositional optimism.
Discussion
Study 1 was designed to test competing hypotheses about the relation of 
dispositional optimism to the processing of valenced health messages. If the valence- 
enhancement hypothesis (Geers et al., 2003) held true, optimists would respond to the 
valence of persuasive message to a greater extent than would pessimists. However, we 
argued that optimism may act as a personal resource in processing threatening 
information, and thus the effects of optimism would be stronger among participants 
exposed to a negative persuasive message than among those exposed to a positive 
message. Study 1 provided partial support to both the valence-enhancement and our 
hypotheses. We believe that optimists may alter their attitudes in a way that increases the 
likelihood of positive future outcomes and/or minimizes negative future outcomes.
Optimism Fosters Less Negative Affective and More Negative Cognitive 
Responses to Self-relevant Health-threatening Information 
As hypothesized, we found that optimists who regularly consumed caffeinated 
drinks responded to health-threatening information about caffeine use with less negative 
emotional responses (e.g., worried, anxious, frustrated), but were not different from 
pessimists in responding to the health-encouraging message. These results were 
consistent with Kaiser et al. (2004) who demonstrated that optimists adjusted to 
threatening information about prejudice against their own gender better than pessimists 
by showing less negative affect afterwards. Thus, the finding concerning optimists’ less 
negative affective responses to health-threatening persuasive messages aligns with our
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idea that optimistic beliefs acted as personal resources for individuals in handling 
threatening information.
We hypothesized that optimists would process the self-relevant health-threatening 
persuasive message carefully, resulting in differentiation among strong and weak 
arguments. However, our results suggest that optimists’ postmessage attitudes toward 
caffeine consumption did not depend on the quality o f persuasive messages, but they 
were influenced by the valence of the messages, as predicted by the valence-enhancement 
hypothesis (Geers et al., 2003). Particularly, we found that dispositional optimists’ final 
attitudes toward caffeine consumption were not influenced by the strength o f the 
message. We, therefore, did not obtain the differentiation of strong and weak arguments 
which was hypothesized to be a result of optimists’ careful processing of health- 
threatening persuasive messages.
An important question is whether optimists’ failure to differentiate between strong 
and weak arguments indicates their superficial processing of self-relevant persuasive 
messages. The other findings from Study 1 strongly suggested otherwise. Specifically, 
optimists demonstrated greater cognitive elaboration o f the persuasive message than did 
pessimists, especially o f the negative message, as evidenced by three different indicators: 
cognitive response analysis on the thought-and-feeling listing tasks, self-report of 
cognitive effort in message processing, and the judges’ evaluation of participants’ 
message scrutiny. Study 1, therefore, reported strong evidence consistent with previous 
research (Aspinwall & Brunhart, 2000; Aspinwall et al., 2001) that optimism was 
associated with extensive processing o f self-relevant threatening information. Thus, 
failure to respond to the strength of the arguments is not due to shallow processing of the
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messages, but possibly is a result of optimists’ greater responsiveness to message valence 
in making attitudinal judgments.
Taken together, these findings supported our main idea that optimistic beliefs 
promote adaptive responses to information that challenges people’s current health 
behavior, as indicated by fewer negative feelings and greater cognitive elaboration of the 
information, as well as attitude change in the direction that would decrease negative 
future health outcomes.
Optimists’ Cautious Evaluation o f Self-relevant 
Positive Persuasive Messages 
Our results provide some support for the valence-enhancement hypothesis -­
dispositional optimism promotes somewhat enhanced negative attitudes toward caffeine 
use following a persuasive message about its significant harmful effects on cardiac 
function. However, unlike Geers and colleagues, we did not obtain enhancing effects of 
optimism on final attitudes toward caffeine use following positive messages. While this 
result concurs with our prediction that the beneficial role of optimistic beliefs in 
facilitating adaptive coping would be evident when individuals face threatening, but not 
favorable information, this result should be carefully considered due to the apparent 
limited effectiveness of the positive message manipulation. Participants rated the 
positive message as generally weaker than the negative one, possibly because the positive 
message went against their previous knowledge regarding health-compromising 
consequences o f caffeine use. Although the positive message presented a new benefit of 
caffeine use that might justify participants’ caffeine consumption, the benefit did not
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cancel the known harmful effects associated with regular consumption (e.g., caffeine 
addiction). Therefore, it is likely that the positive message was evaluated with the harms 
of caffeine use in mind. Below are examples of cognitive responses to the positive 
message about benefit of caffeine use from participants (regardless of their optimism 
level).
Example 1: “I was surprised that caffeine might have some benefits, because it’s 
not something I ’ve ever heard/considered before. (I) had to reread the statement a 
couple times to make sure I wasn’t misreading it, because all that is ever 
mentioned is how bad it is for you.”
Example 2: “I was somewhat skeptical about the caffeine research. My belief is 
that caffeine can cause more harm on human body than good. Conventional 
wisdom is that caffeine is an addictive drug that can cause unpleasant withdrawal 
symptoms.”
At least to some extent, participants evaluated the positive message encouraging 
caffeine use as weaker than the negative message because the positive message 
contradicted their knowledge about the negative effects of caffeine. The results of Study 
1 regarding the positive message, therefore, cannot be concluded to be inconsistent with 
the valence-enhancement hypothesis, but also cannot be considered to be strong evidence 
supporting our hypothesis that the role of optimism would not be evidenced when people 
processed positive information.
Interestingly, we found that optimists were critical in their processing of the 
positive message by listing more thoughts questioning the validity o f the strong research 
evidence that suggested the benefits of caffeine use than did pessimists, possibly because 
the message did not adequately acknowledge the harms of caffeine. The tendency for 
optimists to take into account both positive and negative outcomes of caffeine use in 
making a judgment of whether to accept the positive message suggests that optimists look
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carefully at the possibilities of both negative and positive health outcomes of caffeine 
use. Rather than responding only to valence of the message (positive) as suggested by 
the valence-enhancement hypothesis, optimists in the positive message condition 
seemingly responded to the overall valence of the likely outcomes of caffeine 
consumption (both positive and negative). This observation suggests that optimistic 
beliefs might moderate attitude change via enhanced responsiveness to likelihood of 
experiencing positive and negative future outcomes associated with practicing a 
recommended health behavior.
The idea of optimists’ enhanced responsiveness to the valence of possible 
outcomes of accepting an attitude object could explain the inconsistency between our 
results and those of Geers et al. (2003) study that documented the enhancing effect of 
dispositional optimism on attitude change following positive messages. Optimists (and 
pessimists) in Geers and colleagues’ study were exposed to novel attitude objects. 
Without pre-existing knowledge to verify the likelihood of attaining negative and positive 
outcomes of accepting or rejecting the attitude objects, their attitudes thus were 
influenced by the valenced persuasive message as the most salient source of information 
regarding valence of future outcomes.
To summarize, optimists in Study 1 seemed to evaluate positive persuasive 
messages cautiously. They were more likely than pessimists to counterargue strong 
evidence supporting such messages, possibly because the positive message did not 
adequately take into account the likelihood of negative outcomes associated with the 
behavior recommended as beneficial.
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Cognitive and Affective Mediators of Optimism’s Moderation 
of Processing of Health Risks and Benefits 
The moderating effects o f optimism on postmessage attitudes were hypothesized 
to occur not only through cognitive, but also affective responses to the persuasive 
messages. As predicted, we found that cognitive responses to the persuasive messages, 
namely, negativity of thoughts concerning caffeine use, explained the relationship 
between dispositional optimism’s moderation of message valence and final attitudes 
toward caffeine use. Optimists generated a greater proportion of anti-caffeine thoughts 
following the negative message than did pessimists, and such negativity of thought 
significantly predicted more negative subsequent attitudes toward caffeine use. 
Importantly, negative affective responses to self-relevant, health persuasive information 
were also a significant mediator of the relationship, such that dispositional optimists 
listed fewer negative affective responses to the negative messages than did pessimists. 
The less negative feelings, however, contributed to more positive attitudes toward 
caffeine use. Although the two mediators of optimism’s moderation of attitude change 
worked against each other, we found that the anticaffeine thoughts had a stronger effect 
on final attitudes toward caffeine use than the negative affective response. Thus, though 
optimists’ less negative feelings might inform them that the health-threatening effect of 
caffeinated drinks was not too bad (which might be true, e.g., if used in moderation), 
optimists did not reject and even elaborated on the information concerning serious 
harmful effects of caffeine use in making attitudinal judgments about caffeine 
consumption. As a result, optimists’ attitudes toward the health threat were altered in a 
way that would promote the prevention o f harmful outcomes. Therefore, in line with
previous studies that highlighted the important role of affective responses in the attitude 
change process (Rosselli et al., 1995; Zuwerink & Devine, 1996), Study 1 extended 
previous research by providing the first evidence that both cognitive and affective 
responses to self-relevant health-related persuasive messages explain the role of optimism 
on attitude change in response to negatively valenced messages, albeit in opposing 
directions.
Implications for Optimism Research 
The findings of Study 1 demonstrated a significant role of dispositional optimism 
on persuasion processes and outcomes regarding self-relevant health behavior. The 
findings that optimism was associated with greater elaboration o f and fewer negative 
affective responses to a threatening persuasive message aligned with our hypothesis that 
optimism was associated with greater personal resources to cope with self-threatening 
information (Chang, 1998; Kaiser et al., 2004; Peacock & Wong, 1996). The finding that 
optimists changed their attitudes in a way that would be beneficial to their health, 
however, still needs a specific explanation. We propose that optimism is associated with 
increased vigilance to information about the valence of outcomes compared to other 
features of a persuasive message (e.g., strength of argument). Optimists might consider 
the likelihood of attaining negative and positive outcomes associated with the behavior in 
question, and alter their attitudes in a way that increases the likelihood of attaining 
favorable future outcomes and decreases the likelihood of experiencing unfavorable 
future outcomes. According to this idea, because caffeine use is known to have some 
negative consequences, using caffeine for the benefit of heart health is unlikely to yield
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unequivocally positive future outcomes. Optimists thus did not increase positive attitudes 
toward caffeine use following the positive message.
Strengths and Potential Limitations of Study 1
Study 1 possesses some strengths in examining the moderating role o f optimism 
in attitude change processes and outcomes. First, it replicated and extended previous 
research by demonstrating the role of dispositional optimism in attitude change. Study 1 
also measured three different indicators o f cognitive elaboration, namely, the thought- 
and-feeling listing tasks, self-rating of cognitive effort, and judges’ rating of cognitive 
elaboration, and thus provided strong evidence regarding optimists’ extensive elaboration 
of a negative persuasive message about health risks. Importantly, for the first time, we 
investigated an affective pathway through which optimism moderates the effects of 
message valence on attitude change. To confidently conclude that the observed pattern of 
results is unique to optimism, we provided tests for confounding effects of five individual 
differences related to optimism, namely, neuroticism, self-mastery, trait self-esteem, 
positive-trait affectivity, and naive optimism, and none of these were found to account for 
the pattern of results.
The present study mirrored several important aspects of the real-world experience 
of persuasion by exposing people with initial attitudes toward their own health behavior 
to persuasive messages that were similar to health information generally available via the 
Internet or health magazines. With rather high external validity in regard to the 
characteristics o f message content, we believe that the findings could be generalized to 
responses to persuasive communications regarding other similar health behaviors that
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people generally hold moderately negative attitudes toward, such as marijuana use 
(Simons & Carey, 1998).
The current study also possesses some potential limitations. As mentioned 
earlier, our positive message was rated by participants as less convincing than the 
negative one. Although the weakness in the positive message manipulation could pose a 
threat to internal validity o f Study 1 (that we did not obtain significant results using 
optimism and argument strength to predict attitude and intention in the positive message 
condition), participants’ evaluation of the positive message might represent actual 
responses to such information in real settings when people face a persuasive message that 
is inconsistent with their existing knowledge (even though it may be consistent with their 
current behavior). Nevertheless, it will be important in future research to improve the 
operationalization of positive messages about the health-promoting effects of one’s own 
health behavior to more fully test the relation of optimism to responses to such messages.
STUDY 2: OPTIMISM AND PROCESSING OF FEAR-AROUSING 
MESSAGE AND ACTION RECOMMENDATION
To further test whether optimism promoted less defensive processing in dealing 
with threatening information, Study 2 replicated and extended Study 1 in several ways. 
First, Study 2 adopted the fear appeal paradigm to examine whether optimism facilitated 
coping with self-relevant fear-arousing information by experimentally manipulating 
individuals’ risk of a serious health problem. A significant health threat should elicit 
more defensive responses from individuals who are at high risk than from those at low 
risk. Second, Study 2 examined whether optimistic belief promoted less defensive 
processing of persuasive messages by manipulating the stated effectiveness of an action 
recommendation (i.e., response efficacy) following fear-arousing information about a 
health threat. If optimistic beliefs decreased positive bias (a manifestation o f defense 
motivation after exposure to fear appeals characterized by overly positive evaluation of a 
recommended action; Das et al., 2003; de Hoog et al., 2005) in evaluating an action 
recommendation, optimists at risk for a health threat should show increased 
differentiation among different levels of response efficacy, as well as enhanced positive 
attitudes toward the highly effective and enhanced negative attitudes toward the 
ineffective training. However, if optimism increased outcome valence-focused 
processing, optimism should only enhance positive attitudes toward the highly effective 
action recommendation, as this recommendation was clearly associated with positive
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outcomes in averting the threat. Third, Study 2 aimed to investigate how optimistic 
beliefs influenced cognitive and affective responses to both fear-arousing information and 
action recommendations. Use of a persuasion strategy focused primarily on eliciting 
(negative) emotional responses, such as a fear appeal, provided another test o f the role of 
affective responses to persuasive messages in mediating the effects of optimistic beliefs 
on attitude change observed in Study 1.
Study 2, therefore, supplemented Study 1 by testing the role of optimism in 
response to health-threatening information. It also extended Study 1, in which 
vulnerability was measured in terms of daily caffeine consumption, by experimentally 
varying individuals’ chance of experiencing future negative outcomes from a health 
threat (i.e., risk). It should be noted that, similar to Study 1, severity o f the health threat 
was held constant at a high level in all conditions. Further, Study 2 specifically tested the 
influences of optimistic beliefs on attitudinal judgments regarding positive persuasive 
messages (i.e., information concerning positive outcomes of a health-prevention 
behavior), which had been unclear from Study 1 findings.
Hypotheses
Optimistic beliefs were expected to assist individuals in dealing with threatening 
information. As a result, optimists at high risk for a serious health threat should show 
less negative affective responses to fear-arousing information as compared to pessimists. 
In line with the results of Study 1 regarding optimism’s moderating effects on attitude 
change, we also predicted that optimism would promote outcome valence-focused 
processing, such that optimists at high risk for a health threat would show greater positive
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feelings, thoughts, and attitudes toward the highly effective action recommendation, but 
not the moderate and low efficacy training, as compared to pessimists. The positive 
feelings and thoughts regarding the highly effective recommendation were hypothesized 
to explain moderating effect of optimism on attitude toward the action recommendation. 
For optimists whose risk for the health threat was low, however, positive outcomes 
associated with the highly effective action recommendation would have low impact. As a 




Participants were 124 undergraduate students from the University of Utah 
recruited through the Psychology Department undergraduate participant pool. All 
participants received partial course credit for their participation.
Design
This study employed a dispositional optimism (continuous measure) x 2 (risk for 
repetitive strain injury: high versus low) x 3 (response efficacy of the recommended 
treatment program: high, moderate, and low) between-subjects design. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of these six cells.
Procedure
Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants were told that the study, conducted in 
conjunction with the Student Health Services of the University o f Utah, involved a survey 
of college students in an attempt to raise students’ awareness o f some important health 
issues. Study 2 used repetitive strain injury (RSI), a disorder occurring when movable 
parts of the limbs, especially hands and wrists, are injured due to excessive and/or 
repetitive use of limbs and sustained or awkward positions. Although RSI is an actual 
health problem, it is not a well-known one among young adults, probably due to the fact 
that its effects are more pervasive among adult workers. To convince participants that 
RSI was a real health problem, posters that briefly described RSI and encouraged taking 
an RSI diagnostic test at the Student Health Services were posted on the laboratory wall 
close to where participants were seated. Participants were first asked to complete 
computerized measures o f individual differences similar to Study 1, including the 
measures of dispositional optimism and a brief health survey that included a fictitious 
diagnostic test assessing participants’ risk for developing RSI. Next, participants were 
asked to read an RSI information sheet that presented a fear-arousing message about 
RSI while the experimenter went into another room nearby to print their RSI 
diagnosis results. Participants then received false feedback on their responses to the 
fictitious RSI diagnosis test indicating either that they were at risk or not at risk for 
developing RSI. After that, participants were asked to read a one-page flyer describing a 
(fictitious) free-of-charge RSI-prevention training provided by the university. In the 
message, the effectiveness of the program was manipulated to be high, moderate, or low. 
Next, participants’ attitudes and intention were measured. Participants were then
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presented with an opportunity to reserve a seat in the training and subscribe to a biweekly 
email newsletter concerning prevention of RSI. Participants’ cognitive and affective 
responses toward the fear-arousing information about RSI and the training 
recommendation were next assessed on the open-ended, thought-and-feeling listing tasks 
used in Study 1. Finally, manipulation check questions were administered. Participants 
then were carefully debriefed and thanked for their participation.
Measures and Materials 
Measures of Optimism and Other Individual Differences
Dispositional optimism. The LOT-R (Scheier et al., 1994) was again used to 
assess dispositional optimism (a = .72).
Individual differences related to optimism. Four additional personality constructs, 
namely, neuroticism (Costa & McCrae, 1992; a = .84), self-mastery (Pearlin & Schooler, 
1978; a = .81), trait positive affectivity (Watson & Clark, 1994; a = .8 8 ), and trait self­
esteem (Rosenberg, 1965; a = .90) were measured using the same scales as in Study 1.
Manipulations of Predictors
Risk for RSI. To manipulate risk for RSI, participants were first asked to fill out a 
computerized health survey assessing regular engagement in activities that involved 
repetitive movements and high stress level and the presence of symptoms of pre-RSI. 
Next, the experimenter informed participants that the health survey they filled out was 
actually a RSI diagnostic test provided by the Student Health Services and that their 
responses on the health survey were being processed by a computer in a nearby room.
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While waiting for the diagnostic results to be printed, participants were asked to complete 
computerized personality measures. The experimenter left the laboratory for about 5 
minutes and came back with fictitious RSI diagnostic results. The experimenter first 
asked participants to read a 440-word information sheet describing symptoms and severe 
negative consequences o f RSI, such as feelings o f paralysis, inflammation of 
tendons, nerve damage, and incapacity o f limbs. RSI was presented as a new health 
threat to college students due to activities such as frequent computer use, texting, and 
playing videogames (see Appendix C for the complete text). Participants then received 
false RSI diagnostic results that indicated that they were either “at risk of repetitive strain 
injury” based on “repetitive uses o f limbs/signs of pre-RSI” (high-risk condition) or “not 
at risk of repetitive strain injury” based on “no serious repetitive or overuse of limbs/no 
sign of RSI” (low-risk condition; see Appendix D for the complete text). Thus, to 
manipulate RSI risk, we presented two kinds of risk information to participants-- 
information about increasing prevalence of RSI among college students and false 
feedback regarding personal risk. For the high-risk manipulation, therefore, participants 
were told that they and their group were at risk for RSI. For the low-risk manipulation, 
participants were told that their group, but not themselves, were at risk for RSI.
Response efficacy of the RSI-prevention training. Orthogonal to the risk 
manipulation, participants were assigned to one of three conditions manipulating the 
response efficacy of a potential intervention to prevent RSI (training). These conditions 
were manipulated in the following manner: Participants were told that the program had 
been tested at different universities, and that it was found to be very successful, as 8 8 % of 
students who participated in the training showed decreased risk of RSI after participation
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(high response-efficacy condition), that the program was moderately successful, as 50% 
of students showed decreased RSI risk after participation (moderate response-efficacy 
condition), or that the program was slightly successful, as only 1 2 % of students showed 
decreased RSI risk after participation (low response-efficacy condition; see Appendix E 
for the complete text).
Main Outcomes
Attitudes toward the RSI-prevention training. Participants’ attitudes toward the 
RSI-prevention training was assessed by their rating of how good, important, and 
interesting they thought the training was, and how much they liked the training on a scale 
from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much). Responses from all four items (a = .8 6 ) were 
averaged to create an index of favorable attitudes toward the training.
Intention to participate in the RSI-prevention training. Following the attitude 
measures, participants were asked to indicate if they should, will, are going to, and are 
interested in participating in the RSI-prevention training on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 9 
(very likely). The four items formed a highly reliable scale (a = .96).
Behavioral indications of RSI prevention. Upon receiving the flyer about the 
RSI-prevention training, participants were told that the university would like to estimate 
the number of students interested in the training. The experimenter handed out a short 
form and asked participants to indicate if they wanted to reserve a seat in the training 
and/or wanted to subscribe for a biweekly email newsletter about RSI. Those who 
wanted to do so were also asked to write down their name and email address for future 
contact. The opportunity to subscribe to the email newsletter about RSI was provided as
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an alternative way to acquire information regarding RSI prevention that participants 
might adopt when the RSI-prevention training was perceived as unhelpful (i.e., when it 
had low response efficacy).
Cognitive and Affective Reponses to the Persuasive Message
Thought-and-feeling listing tasks. Thought-and feeling-listing tasks identical to 
those used in Study 1 were administered twice. After participants read both the fear- 
arousing information and the action recommendation, they were asked to complete two 
thought-and-feeling listing tasks--the first one for responses to the fear-arousing 




Risk for RSI. As a check on the risk manipulation, participants were asked the 
extent to which they agreed with four statements about their risk o f developing RSI, such 
as “If  you do not take any special action now, it is likely that you will develop Repetitive 
Strain Injury (RSI) in the future” on a 9-point scale (1 = strongly disagree to 9 = strongly 
agree). A two-way Risk x Response Efficacy ANOVA indicated a significant main 
effect of the risk manipulation, F  (1, 118) = 42.61, p  < .001, such that participants in the 
high risk condition (M = 5.61, SD = 1.55) reported higher RSI risk than did those in the 
low risk condition (M = 3.71, SD = 1.83). However, there was also a significant main 
effect of response efficacy, F  (1, 118) = 3.47, p  < .05, indicating a difference in RSI risk
ratings among participants in different response efficacy conditions. A Bonferroni post- 
hoc test indicated that participants in the high response-efficacy condition (M = 5.13, SD 
= 1.84) rated themselves as somewhat more vulnerable to RSI than did those in moderate 
response efficacy group (M = 4.33, SD = 1.98, t (83) = 1.93,p  < .09). Participants in the 
low response efficacy group (M = 4.71, SD = 1.93) did not significantly differ from either 
the moderate, t (80) = -0.88, p  < .38, or the high response efficacy group, t (79) = -1.00, p
< .32, in perceived RSI risk.
Response efficacy. As a check on the response efficacy manipulation, 
participants were asked the extent to which they agreed with three statements describing 
beliefs regarding efficacy of the RSI-prevention training in preventing RSI, such as 
“Participating in the RSI-prevention training can help lower your risk for Repetitive 
Strain Injury (RSI)” on a 9-point scale (1 = strongly disagree to 9 = strongly agree). A 
two-way ANOVA indicated a significant main effect of the response efficacy 
manipulation, F  (2, 118) = 6.23, p  < .01, on participants’ rating of training effectiveness. 
Contrasts revealed that the means of the response efficacy rating of the three groups were 
in the expected order: Participants in high response-efficacy condition (M = 5.96, SD = 
1.67) rated the training as more effective that did those in the low response-efficacy 
condition (M = 4.79, SD = 1.62, t (121) = 3.22,p  < .01), while the difference between the 
ratings of participants in high and moderate (M = 5.14, SD = 1.60) response-efficacy 
conditions was marginally significant, t (121) = 2.32, p  < .07). However, there was no 
difference in response efficacy ratings between the low and moderate response-efficacy 
conditions (t < 1). The main effect of the risk manipulation was also marginally 
significant, F  (1, 118) = 3.17, p  = .078, such that participants in the high-risk condition
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(M = 5.48, SD = 1.74) rated the training as somewhat more effective than those in the 
low-risk condition (M = 5.11, SD = 1.62). No interaction effect was observed.
Descriptive Statistics
Correlations among optimism, the other individual differences, and the outcome 
measures, as well as means and standard deviations, are presented in Table 4.
Primary Results
Attitudes, Intentions, and Behavioral Indicators of Desire to Prevent RSI
Hierarchical regression analyses were used to test whether optimism, risk for RSI, 
and response efficacy predicted attitudes toward the RSI-prevention training and 
intentions to participate in the training. As in Study 1, the first step controlled for age 
and gender. Next, the main effects of dispositional optimism (centered), risk (dummy 
coded), response efficacy (dummy coded with the low response-efficacy condition as the 
reference group) were entered in the second step, followed by the two-way interaction 
terms in Step 3, and all three-way interaction terms in Step 4. Interaction slopes were 
interpreted for low (-1 SD) and high optimism (+1 SD) 5 according to the procedures 
specified in Aiken and West (1991).
Attitudes toward the RSI-prevention training. As shown in Table 5, a significant 
Step 2, AR2  = .13, AF (4,117) = 4.42, p  < .01, revealed significant main effects of 
dispositional optimism (fi = .24, p  <.01) and high response efficacy (fi = .29, p  < .0 1 ),
5 Low dispositional optimists in Study 2 were those whose scores were equal to or lower than 3.24 on a 
scale from 1-5 of the LOT-R, whereas high dispositional optimists were those whose scores were equal to 
or greater than 4.52. Therefore, similar to Study 1, low optimists (i.e., pessimists) in this sample were those 




Correlations and Means o f Optimism, Related Individual Differences, and Attitudes 
Toward and Intentions to Participate in the RSI-prevention Training
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I. Dispositional optimism -- 2 4 * i09 -i49*** 53*** 60*** 5 4 ***
2i Attitudes toward the RSI- 
prevention training -- 70*** -i09 i09 i09 i0 2
3i Intention to participate in 
the training -- i05 -i09 i0 0 -i0 0
4i Neuroticism -- - 4 8 *** -i6 8 *** - 4 7 ***
5i Self-mastery -- i58*** i44***
6 1 Self-esteem -- i69***
7i Positive affectivity --
M 3i88 5i60 4i05 2i67 5i77 3i99 3i65
SD 0.64 1i52 2.24 0i73 0.92 0i75 0.64
Range 1-5 1-9 1-9 1-5 1-7 1-5 1-5
N 124 124 124 124 124 124 124
Note. *p < i05i **p < .Oil ***p < i001i
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Standardized Regression Coefficients (with AR2) From Hierarchical Regression Analyses 
With Dispositional Optimism, Risk, and Response Efficacy Predicting Attitudes Toward 




AR2 p AR2 B
Step 1 .02 .00
Age -.04 .04
Gender .13 .24
Step 2 .13** .16***
Age -.07 .04
Gender .12 .04
Dispositional optimism .24* .11
Risk .09 .36***
Moderate response efficacy .04 .05
High response efficacy .29** .22*
Step 3 .08* .06
Age -.03 .07
Gender .18 .08
Dispositional optimism -.23 -.15
Risk .13 .35
Moderate response efficacy .06 .01
High response efficacy .35 .25
Dispositional optimism x Risk .11 .08
Dispositional optimism x Moderate response 1 5  0 0  
efficacy
Dispositional optimism x High response 4 7 ** 3 1 * 
efficacy
Risk x Moderate response efficacy .02 .09
Risk x High response efficacy -.06 -.04
Step 4 .06** .01
Age -.03 .08
Gender .19 .08
Dispositional optimism .43 .14
Risk .08 .32
Moderate response efficacy .00 -.01
High response efficacy .30 .23
Dispositional optimism x Risk -.50 -.19
Dispositional optimism x Moderate response 2 4  2 1  
efficacy
Dispositional optimism x High response 0 5  1 1  
efficacy
Risk x Moderate response efficacy .06 .10
Risk x High response efficacy -.01 -.02
Dispositional optimism x Risk x Moderate .34* . 2 2  
response efficacy
Dispositional optimism x Risk x High 5 0 ** 1 6
response efficacy________________________________ '___________________ '_____
Note. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
such that higher optimism and high response efficacy predicted more favorable attitudes 
toward the RSI-prevention training. A significant Step 3, AR2  = .08, AF (5,112) = 2.41, p
< i05, contained a significant Dispositional Optimism x High Response Efficacy 
interaction (fi = .47, p  < .01). Importantly, in the last step of the analysis, AR2  = .06, AF 
(2,110) = 4i98,p  < i01, there were significant three-way Dispositional Optimism x Risk x 
High Response Efficacy (fi = .50, p  < .01) and Dispositional Optimism x Risk x Moderate 
Response Efficacy interactions (fi = .34, p  < .05). As shown in Figure 9, when RSI risk 
was high, dispositional optimism significantly predicted more favorable attitudes when 
the training was highly effective (slope = 2.72, t (116) = 4.77, p  < .001), showed a trend 
in predicting more favorable attitudes when the training was moderately effective (slope 
= 0i89, t =1i68,p  < i10), and did not predict attitudes when the training was ineffective 
(slope = -0.42, t < 1)i When RSI risk was low, dispositional optimism significantly 
predicted more favorable attitudes when the training was highly effective (slope = 0.84, t 
(116) = 2.40, p  < i02), but was not related to attitudes toward the RSI-prevention training 
when it was ineffective (slope = 1.08, t (116) = 1.40, p  < .17) or moderately effective 
(slope = -0i27, t < 1)i Regression line comparisons at the specific values of optimism 
(i.e., 1 SD above and below the mean) in the high risk condition showed that optimists’ 
attitudes toward the training were more favorable when the training was highly effective 
than when it was moderately effective (t (37) = 2.23, p  < .05) or ineffective (t (40) = 4.15, 
p  < .0 0 1 ), while optimists’ attitudes toward the moderately effective and ineffective 
trainings were not significantly different from each other (t (43) = 1.51, p  < 14)i 
Pessimists’ attitudes toward the training, however, did not differ as a function of its stated 








































Figure 9. Relation of dispositional optimism to predicted attitudes toward the RSI- 
prevention training, as a function of response efficacy, in the high- and low-risk 
conditions.
Note. Higher numbers indicate more favorable attitudes.
efficacy, t (40) = -1.53, p  < . 14). Finally, the slope of the highly effective training in the 
high-risk condition was significantly greater than that in the low-risk condition (t (38) = 
3.29, p  < .0 1 ), indicating that the moderating effect of optimism on attitudes toward 
highly effective training was stronger in the high- than the low-risk condition.
To summarize, when at high risk for RSI, dispositional optimists showed 
significant more favorable attitudes toward the highly effective RSI-prevention training, 
showed a trend to enhance attitudes toward the moderately effective training, and did not 
differ from pessimists in their attitudes toward ineffective training. Optimists at high risk 
also evaluated the highly effective training as significantly better than the moderately 
effective and ineffective trainings. This pattern of the results in large part supported the 
prediction based on the outcome valence-focused processing that optimistic beliefs 
increase responsiveness to likelihood of obtaining positive outcomes (i.e., reducing RSI 
risk). Interestingly, there was an unpredicted enhancement effect of dispositional 
optimism on the highly effective training in the low-risk condition, indicating that 
optimists evaluated the highly effective training more positively than did pessimists even 
though their risk for RSI was low.
Intention to participate in the RSI-prevention training. Overall, participants 
showed rather low intentions to join the RSI-prevention training (M  = 4.05 on a scale 
from 1 to 9, SD = 2.24). Participants’ intention to join the RSI-prevention training was 
examined using primary hierarchical regression analyses. As shown in Table 5, only the 
second step was significant, AR2  = .16, AF (4,117) = 5.48,p  < .001, with main effects of 
the risk manipulation (fi = .36, p  < .001) and high response efficacy (fi = .22, p  < .05), 
such that participants in the high-risk condition and highly effective training condition
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showed stronger intentions to participate in the RSI-prevention training. Dispositional 
optimism, however, was not a significant predictor. No other significant results were 
obtained. Therefore, dispositional optimism did not predict intentions to participate in 
the RSI-prevention training.
Behavioral indications of desire to prevent RSI. To examine whether optimism, 
RSI risk, and response efficacy predicted seat reservation for the RSI-prevention training 
and subscription to the biweekly RSI email newsletter, sequential logistic regression 
analyses were performed separately for each outcome using the steps similar to the 
primary hierarchical regression analysis. A number of 1 was given if participants 
checked the box indicating that they wanted to reserve a seat for the training, or if they 
provided their email address for receiving the email newsletter. A number of 0 was given 
if they did not do so. Due to a technical problem, we failed to collect the responses from 
2 0  participants for both the seat reservation and the newsletter subscription, leaving N  = 
104 for the logistic regression analyses.
Seat reservation for the RSI-prevention trainings Overall, 21 participants 
(20.19%) reserved a seat for the RSI-prevention training, while 83 did not. Results of the 
logistic regression analyses with dispositional optimism revealed a significant second 
step, x  (4, N  = 104) = 13.33,p  = .01, R 2 (Cox & Snell) = .15, with a significant main 
effect of the risk manipulation (B = 211, p  < .01). The model correctly predicted 81.7% 
of cases. More participants in the high-risk condition (3.85%) than those in the low-risk 
condition (0.40%) were likely to reserve a seat for the RSI-prevention training. No other 
significant results were observed.
Subscription to the biweekly email newsletter regarding RSI. Twenty-nine
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participants (27.9%) provided their email addresses in order to receive the RSI 
newsletter, while 75 of them did not. A sequential logistic regression revealed a 
significant last step, X  (2, N  = 104) = 6.13, p  < .05), R 2  (Cox & Snell) = .22, with a 
marginally significant Dispositional Optimism x Risk x Moderate Response Efficacy 
interaction (B = 5.86, p  = .086). The model with the three-way interaction correctly 
predicted 72.1% of cases. As shown in Figure 10, when RSI risk was high, optimists 
(62.41%) were predicted to be more likely to subscribe to the RSI newsletter than 
pessimists (19.35%) when the RSI-prevention training was ineffective. When the 
training was moderately effective, optimists (47.37%) were more likely than pessimists 
(20.63%) to subscribe to the RSI newsletter. When RSI risk was low, optimists (80.62%) 
were more likely than pessimists to subscribe to the newsletter (2.34%) when the training 
program was ineffective. When the training was moderately effective, however, 
optimists at low risk (3.76%) were less likely than pessimists (44.44%) to subscribe to the 
newsletter.
The email newsletter may have represented alternative means of attaining useful 
information about preventing RSI, especially when the training was described as 
unhelpful. Our findings indicated that when RSI risk was high, dispositional optimists 
were more likely than pessimists to seek potentially useful information about RSI and 
RSI prevention. This is especially true when the training was said to be ineffective.
Cognitive and Affective Responses to the Fear-arousing Communication
Two independent raters coded thoughts and feelings listed in the thought-and- 












Figure 10. Relation of dispositional optimism to predicted probability o f subscribing to 
email newsletter about RSI, as a function of moderate and low response efficacy of the 
RSI-prevention training, in the high- and low-risk conditions.
Note. Higher numbers indicate higher probability.
and responses to the RSI-prevention training. Then, a proportion of positive thoughts 
index, a proportion of negative thoughts index, and an affective response index were 
created for each set of responses using the same procedure employed in Study 1. 
Correlations among the cognitive and affective indices, optimism, and the main outcomes 
are presented in Table 6 . The correlations among the six cognitive and affective indices 
from the thought-and-feeling listing tasks indicated that these indices did not overlap.
Thoughts and feelings in response to fear-arousing information about RSI.
Similar to Study 1, affective responses were categorized into three mutually exclusive 
categories: positive affective responses, negative affective responses, and neutral feelings 
(see Appendix F for frequency of each category). Cognitive responses were categorized 
into seven mutually exclusive categories: positive thoughts or thoughts in agreement with 
the information about RSI health threat ("The information is helpful"), negative thoughts 
or thoughts counterarguing the information about RSI health threat (“I  think RSI is kind of 
silly because i t ’s something that is resolved by common sense"), thoughts regarding 
perceptions o f high risk and severity o f RSI (“I  knew I  would probably be at high risk for 
RSI"), thoughts regarding perceptions of low risk and severity o f RSI (“My work is hands 
on so I  really do not consider myself at risk”), thoughts indicating desire to reduce RSI 
risk (“I f  it is a slow process, it is important to use prevention now"), thoughts indicating 
desire for further information (“I  should probably learn more""), and unrelated thoughts 
(see Appendix F for frequency of each category). Agreement between the two judges 
was 86.81%. It should be noted that some participants listed thoughts about the RSI- 
prevention training when they were asked to provide thoughts about risk and severity of 




Correlations Among Optimism, Cognitive and Affective Response Indices, and Attitudes 
Toward and Intention to Participate in the RSI-prevention Training
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Dispositional optimism o\©4©-. -.08 -.2 2 * .03 .2 0 * **4.2 .09
2. Proportion of negative thoughts
-.08 .09 **0
cn
-.07 - . 1 1 -.36*** -.17+
about RSI
3. Proportion of positive thoughts
-.15 -.04 - . 0 1 - . 1 1 .04 - . 0 1
about RSI
4. Negative affective response to
.06 - . 1 0 - . 0 2 -.09 . 0 1
RSI
5. Proportion of negative thoughts
- . 1 0 -.24** -.39*** -.34***
about RSI-prevention training
6 . Proportion of positive thoughts
.25** .03 -.03
about RSI-prevention training
7. Positive affective response to
.17+ .13
RSI-prevention training
8 . Attitudes toward the RSI-
.70***
prevention training
9. Intention to participate in the
RSI-prevention training
Note. +p < .06. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
in the wrong category and these thoughts were analyzed in the correct category. 
Disagreements about coding or category assignment were resolved through discussion. 
Three response indices were created, including a proportion of negative thought index 
(created from the negative thoughts counterarguing the information about RSI health 
threat), a proportion of positive thoughts (created from the positive thoughts agreeing 
with the information about RSI health threat), and a negative affective response index. 
Each of the cognitive and affective indices was then entered in hierarchical regressions 
similar to the primary analysis.
Proportion o f negative thought about RSI health threat index. The second step
of the analysis, AR2  = .10, A F (4,117) = 3.32,p  < .05, revealed main effects of moderate 
response efficacy (fi = -.31, p  < .01) and high response efficacy (fi = -.28, p  < .01), such 
that participants generated a lower proportion of thoughts counterarguing the fear- 
arousing information about RSI when the RSI-prevention training was either moderately 
or highly effective. Interestingly, in a significant Step 4, AR2  = .06, AF (2,110) = 4.00, p
< .05, there was a marginally significant Dispositional Optimism x Risk x Moderate 
Response Efficacy (fi = -.34, p  = .061) and a significant Dispositional Optimism x Risk x 
High Response Efficacy interaction (fi = -.48, p  < .01). As depicted in Figure 11, when 
RSI risk was high, dispositional optimism significantly predicted a greater proportion of 
negative thoughts counterarguing against the information about RSI health threat only 
when the training was ineffective (slope = 0.14, t (120) = 2.33, p  < .05), but did not 
predict the proportion of such thoughts when the training was moderately (slope = -0.03, 
t <1) or highly effective (slope = -0.14, t (116) = -1.40, p  < .17). However, when RSI 
risk was low, dispositional optimism was unrelated to the proportion of counterarguments 
to the information about RSI health threat when the effectiveness of the training was low 
(slope = -0.15, t (120) = -1.50, p  < .14), moderate (slope = 0.00, t <1), or high (slope = - 
0.02, t <1). No other significant results were observed.
In sum, optimists generated a greater proportion of counterarguments against the 
fear-arousing information about the RSI health threat than did pessimists when the RSI- 
prevention training was not effective in preventing RSI, and this tendency was intensified 
in the high-risk condition. Interestingly, the finding that optimists derogated the health 
threat to a greater extent than pessimists when the training was ineffective contradicted 









Figure 11. Relation of dispositional optimism to predicted proportion of negative 
thought about RSI health threat index, as a function of response efficacy, in the high- and 
low-risk conditions.
Note. Higher numbers indicate greater proportion of negative thoughts.
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the training program, would be less defensive in processing fear-arousing information 
about the health threat . 6
Proportion o f positive thought about RSI health threat index. A marginally 
significant Step 2 of the analysis, AR2  = .07, AF (4,117) = 2.15, p  = .079, revealed a 
significant main effect of the risk manipulation (fi = -.24, p  < .01) such that participants at 
high risk for RSI listed a lower proportion of positive thoughts in response to the fear- 
arousing information about RSI. No other significant results were obtained. Thus, 
dispositional optimism was not a significant predictor of the proportion of positive 
thoughts about RSI.
Negative affective response to RSI health threat index. Step 3 of the analysis, AR2  
= .08, AF (5,112) = 2.32, p  < .05, revealed a marginally significant Dispositional 
Optimism x Risk interaction (fi = .24, p  = .059). As depicted in Figure 12, dispositional 
optimism was marginally significant in predicting fewer negative affective responses to
6 Because no previous study has documented optimists’ tendency to react defensively to threatening 
information, we tested the possibility that the predictive effect of dispositional optimism on 
counterarguments against the RSI health threat was contributed by the pessimism factor of the construct, 
according to the bidimensional view of dispositional optimism (Chang, D’Zurilla, & Maydeu-Olivares, 
1994; Chang, Maydeu-Olivares, & D’Zurilla, 1997; Kubzansky, Kubzansky, & Maselko, 2004). A 
pessimism factor was calculated based on an average of three negatively worded LOT-R items. The 
proportion of negative thought counterarguing against RSI health threat was regressed on pessimism factor 
(centered), manipulated RSI risk, and response efficacy. No effects of pessimism were significant. 
However, when the pessimism factor was replaced by the optimism factor comprised of participants’ scores 
on the three positively worded LOT-R items, the Optimism Factor x Risk x High Response Efficacy 
interaction was significant (fi = -.46, p < .05) in a significant Step 4, AR2  = .05, AF (2,110) = 3.28, p < .05, 
such that when RSI risk was high, the optimism factor significantly predicted a greater proportion of 
negative thoughts counterarguing against the fear-arousing information about the RSI health threat when 
the RSI-prevention program was ineffective (slope = 0.13, t (120) = 3.25, p < .01), but predicted lower 
proportion of such thought when the training was highly effective (slope = -0.13, t (116) = -2.17, p < .04). 
However, when RSI risk was low, the optimism factor did not predict proportion of negative thoughts 
counterarguing against RSI health threat when the training was either ineffective (slope = -0.07, t <1) or 
highly effective (slope = -0.02, t <1). It should be noted that the patterns of slopes in the high-risk 
condition mimicked those observed in the analysis with the complete dispositional optimism scale. These 
results thus suggested that it was the optimism, not the pessimism, factor of dispositional optimism that 
produced the patterns of results in predicting the proportion of negative thoughts counterarguing the fear- 


















Figure 12. Relation of dispositional optimism to predicted negative affective response to 
RSI health threat index, as a function of the risk manipulation.
Note. Higher numbers indicate greater negative affective responses.
the RSI health threat in the low-risk condition (slope = -0.83, t (120) = -1.77, p  < .08), but 
did not predict responses to the high-risk condition (slope = -0.07, t <1).
Overall, optimists reported fewer negative affective responses to the fear-arousing 
information about RSI health threat than did pessimists when they were at low risk for 
RSI or when there was low possibility that they would experience the negative outcomes 
from the threat. These results did not support our hypothesis that optimists would show 
less negative affective responses to the fear-arousing information about RSI when their 
risk was high, regardless o f the RSI-prevention training efficacy.
Thoughts and feelings in response to the RSI-prevention recommendation. Two
judges used the same procedure to code participants’ lists of thoughts and feelings toward 
the RSI-prevention training. Affective responses were categorized into positive, 
negative, and neutral affective responses (see Appendix G for frequency of each
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category). Cognitive responses were categorized into five mutually exclusive categories: 
positive thoughts regarding the RSI-prevention training (“I  think the recovery program 
would be good to help people become aware o f a potential problem with R SI’), negative 
thoughts regarding the RSI-prevention training (“I  thought that the 12% benefit was a 
little low”), thoughts indicating desire to prevent RSI (“I  need to prevent any further 
risk"), thoughts indicating desire for more information (“I  want to learn more"), and 
unrelated thoughts (see Appendix G for frequency of each category). Agreement 
between the two judges was 93.51%. Coding disagreements were resolved through 
discussion. The following three response indices were created: a proportion of positive 
thought index (created from positive thoughts regarding the RSI-prevention training), a 
proportion of negative thoughts index (created from the negative thoughts regarding the 
RSI-prevention training), and a positive affective response index (created by subtracting 
the number of negative affective responses from the number of positive affective 
responses o f each participant). Each of the cognitive and affective indices was then 
subjected to hierarchical regressions similar to the primary analysis.
Proportion o f negative thought about the RSI-prevention training index. The 
analysis revealed no significant results, indicating that dispositional optimism was not 
related to the proportion o f negative thoughts about the training.
Proportion o f positive thought about RSI-prevention training index. The analysis 
yielded no significant results.
Positive affective response to RSI-prevention training index. The second step, 
AR2  = .08, AF (4,117) = 2.70,p  < .05, revealed a significant main effect of dispositional 
optimism (fi = .22, p  < .05). These results indicated that optimism predicted greater
positive affects in response to the RSI-prevention training. No other significant results 
were found. Unlike the findings that optimism interacted with the risk manipulation in 
predicting negative affective responses to the information about RSI health threat, 
optimists showed greater positive affective responses to the RSI-prevention training than 
did pessimists, regardless of the response efficacy and risk manipulations. These findings 
did not support our prediction that optimists would show greater positive affective 
responses to the training when RSI risk was high and the training was highly effective, as 
compared to pessimists.
In sum, dispositional optimists showed fewer negative affective responses to the 
fear-arousing information about RSI health threat compared to pessimists, but only when 
their RSI risk was low. Optimists also showed greater positive affective responses to the 
recommended action regardless o f its effectiveness. With regard to the cognitive 
responses, optimism was not related to either the proportion of positive thoughts in 
responses to both kinds of information or the proportion of negative thoughts about the 
training recommendation. Optimism, however, predicted a greater proportion of 
counterarguments against the fear-arousing information about RSI when the training was 
ineffective.
Mediation Analyses
We have shown that dispositional optimism, risk for a health threat, and response 
efficacy interacted to predict the proportion of negative thoughts about RSI as a health 
threat. We next tested whether the proportion of negative thoughts about RSI explained 
the moderating effects of dispositional optimism on attitudes toward the RSI-prevention
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training. In accordance with Muller, Judd, and Yzerbyt (2005) who proposed a procedure 
to perform mediated moderation analysis, the proportion of negative thoughts was tested 
as a potential mediator of the Dispositional Optimism x Risk x Moderate Response 
Efficacy and the Dispositional Optimism x Risk x High Response Efficacy interactions 
on attitudes toward the RSI-prevention training. As shown in Table 7, in the first 
regression equation, attitudes toward the RSI-prevention training were regressed on 
dispositional optimism, risk manipulation, moderate response efficacy, high response 
efficacy, and their interactions. The three-way Dispositional Optimism x Risk x 
Moderate Response Efficacy (fi = .38,p  < .05) and the Dispositional Optimism x Risk x 
High Response Efficacy interactions (fi = .48, p  < .01) were significant. In the second 
regression equation, the proportion o f negative thoughts was regressed on dispositional 
optimism, risk manipulation, moderate response efficacy, high response efficacy, and 
their interactions. The three-way Dispositional Optimism x Risk x Moderate Response 
Efficacy (fi = -.36, p  < .05) and the Dispositional Optimism x Risk x High Response 
Efficacy interactions (fi = -.48, p  < .01) were significant. Finally, in the third regression 
equation, attitudes toward the RSI-prevention training was regressed on dispositional 
optimism, risk manipulation, moderate response efficacy, high response efficacy, and 
their interactions, as well as the proportion of negative thoughts and the interaction of the 
proportion of negative thoughts and dispositional optimism. The results indicated that 
the proportion of negative thoughts was significant (fi = -.28, p  < .0 1 ), whereas the effect 
of the Dispositional Optimism x Risk x Moderate Response Efficacy interaction became 
nonsignificant (fi = .26, p  < . 13), and that of the Dispositional Optimism x Risk x High 
Response Efficacy interaction (fi = .29, p  < .08) became marginally significant, indicating
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Table 7
Standardized Regression Coefficients (with AR2) From Mediated Moderation Analyses o f 
Proportion o f Negative Thought About RSI Health Threat Index on Attitudes Toward RSI- 
prevention Training
Criterion
Predictor Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
Attitude Proportion of 
negative thought Attitude
Dispositional optimism i53 -i52 i 13
Risk i05 i0 2 i03
Moderate response efficacy
- i04 *5i3-i -i14
High response efficacy i27 -i32* i18
Dispositional optimism x Risk
- i54 * *5i6 -i31
Dispositional optimism x Moderate
- i29 i30 -i06
response efficacy
Dispositional optimism x High response
-i1 1 i30 i13
efficacy
Risk x Moderate response efficacy i08 i09 i 13
Risk x High response efficacy -i0 1 i07 i04
Dispositional optimism x Risk x
i38 * -i36* i26Moderate response efficacy
Dispositional optimism x Risk x 48** **i4-i 29+High response efficacy 
Proportion of negative thought index 


















Note. + p < i08i *p < i05i **p < i01i ***p < i001i
at least partial mediation Sobel tests of mediation were performed to test the mediating 
effect of the proportion of negative thoughts about RSI health threat indexi The results 
indicated that the indirect effect o f the Dispositional Optimism x Risk x High Response 
Efficacy interaction on the attitudes (as mediated by proportion of negative thoughts) was 
significantly different from zero (z = 2i14, p  < i04), suggesting a significant mediation 
effecti However, the indirect effect of the Dispositional Optimism x Risk x Moderate 
Response Efficacy interaction on the attitude was marginally different from zero (z =
171, p  < i09), indicating at least a marginally significant mediation of the interactioni
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The results of the mediation analysis suggested that the proportion of negative 
thoughts about RSI health threat mediated the moderating role of dispositional optimism 
on the effects of the risk manipulation and high response efficacy on attitudes toward the 
RSI-prevention training, such that optimists at high risk for RSI generated a greater 
proportion of negative thoughts counteraruging against RSI health threat than did 
pessimists when the training was ineffective, and this greater proportion o f negative 
thoughts predicted more negative attitudes toward the training. Thus, optimists’ positive 
attitudes toward the highly effective training were at least partly determined by lower 
counterarguments against RSI. These results did not support our prediction that cognitive 
responses to the training mediated the moderating effect of optimism on attitudes toward 
the training. Instead, thoughts counterarguing against RSI health threat were a significant 
mediator. In addition, unlike the results of Study 1, none of the affective response indices 
from the thought-and-feeling listing tasks was significantly predicted by the interactions 
among dispositional optimism, risk, and response efficacy, suggesting that the affective 
responses to the training were not mediators of the relationship between these interactions 
and attitudes toward the training. These results did not support our prediction that 
affective responses to the training mediated the moderating effect of optimism on 
attitudes toward the training.
Tests of Confounding Effects of Other Individual Differences
To examine whether neuroticism, trait self-esteem, self-mastery, and trait positive 
affectivity were responsible for the predictive effects of optimism obtained for attitudes
toward the RSI-prevention training , 7  each individual difference and its interaction terms 
were added to the primary hierarchical regression analyses as simultaneous predictors 
with optimism. With self-mastery or trait positive affectivity in the equations, the 
Dispositional Optimism x Risk x High Response Efficacy and the Dispositional 
Optimism x Risk x Moderate Response Efficacy effects remained significant and 
virtually equivalent in magnitude, suggesting that these individual differences did not 
confound the effects o f dispositional optimism reported earlier.
Entering trait self-esteem or neuroticism simultaneously in the same model with 
dispositional optimism, however, affected the magnitude and significance of the 
predictive effects of these interactions on attitudes toward the RSI-prevention training. 
With self-esteem in the model, the Dispositional Optimism x Risk x High Response 
Efficacy interaction was marginally significant (dropping from f  = .50, p  < .01 to fi = .38, 
p  < .06), while the effect o f the Dispositional Optimism x Risk x Moderate Response 
Efficacy interaction remained significant with an increase in magnitude (from f  = .34, p  
< .05 to f  = .40, p  < .05). With neuroticism in the equation, the magnitude of both 
interactions was reduced (from f  = .50, p  < .01 to f  = .40, p  < .05 for the Dispositional 
Optimism x Risk x Moderate Response Efficacy, and from f  = .34, p  < .05 to f  = .27, p  < 
.17 for the Dispositional Optimism x Risk x High Response Efficacy interaction). These 
results did not provide strong evidence that trait self-esteem and neuroticism were
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7 Hierarchical regression analyses were also conducted in order to test whether neuroticism, trait self­
esteem, self-mastery, and trait positive affectivity confounded the predictive effects of optimism on the 
proportion of counterarguments against the fear-arousing information about RSI health threat, the negative 
affective responses to RSI health threat, and the positive affective response to the RSI-prevention training 
indices. Results indicated that dispositional optimism maintained its predictive effects on these outcomes 
and that the observed effects of optimism could not be attributed to these individual differences.
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responsible for the predictive effects of the two interactions o f dispositional optimism . 8 
In sum, the moderating effects o f dispositional optimism on attitudes toward the RSI- 
prevention training as a function of risk for RSI and the effectiveness of the training 
program observed in Study 2 were not produced by neuroticism, trait self-esteem, self­
mastery, and trait positive affectivity . 9
Discussion
Study 2 extended Study 1 by specifically testing how optimistic beliefs moderated 
thoughts, feelings, and attitudes toward a health-prevention behavior following exposure 
to fear-arousing information about a health threat. Dispositional optimists at high risk for 
a serious health threat showed more favorable attitudes only toward a highly effective
8 When each individual difference was considered as a predictor of attitudes toward the RSI-prevention 
training in the same model as dispositional optimism, there was a significant effect of the Neuroticism x 
High Response Efficacy interaction (fi = -.36, p < .05) in Step 3, AR2 = .13, AF (8,108) = 2.13, p < .05, such 
that neuroticism significantly predicted more favorable attitudes toward the RSI-prevention training when 
the training was described as ineffective (slope = 0.97, t (120) = 2.02, p < .05), but did not predict such 
attitudes when the training was described as highly effective (slope = -0.27, t <1). Importantly, unlike 
dispositional optimism, neuroticism did not appear to interact with risk for RSI in predicting attitudes 
toward the training. A Self-esteem x High Response Efficacy interaction was also marginally significant (fi 
= .35, p = .06) in Step 3, AR2 = .15, AF (8,108) = 2.94, p < .01. Simple slope testing revealed no significant 
slopes for self-esteem as a predictor of attitudes toward the RSI-prevention training. Patterns of the slopes, 
however, indicated that both low and high self-esteem individuals reported more favorable attitudes toward 
the highly effective training than the ineffective training, while high self-esteem individuals showed greater 
differences in attitudes between highly and low effective training than did low self-esteem individuals. It 
should be noted that these are the same patterns obtained when optimism was a predictor; however, these 
results were not moderated by manipulated RSI risk.
9
 We also examined each individual difference alone as a replacement predictor for optimism in predicting 
attitudes toward the RSI-prevention training. To briefly summarize, self-esteem, positive affectivity, and 
neuroticism interacted with high response efficacy in predicting attitudes toward the training. The 
interactions involving self-esteem and positive affectivity yielded a similar pattern to that found for 
optimism. High self-esteem and high in positive affectivity were associated with differential 
responsiveness to the high and low response efficacy manipulation, with more favorable attitudes following 
the highly effective training. However, participants higher in neuroticism showed the opposite pattern, 
indicating rather similar responses to both high and low response efficacy manipulations. Interestingly, 
while optimism was not a significant predictor of intention to participate in the RSI-prevention training, a 
Self-esteem x High Response Efficacy interaction significantly predicted intention to participate in the 
training. High self-esteem predicted stronger differentiation between highly effective and ineffective 
training in predicting intention to participate in the training, as compared to low self-esteem, with stronger 
intention when the training was said to be highly effective.
recommended action. However, this response was also evidenced in low risk 
circumstances, but with a weaker effect. Interestingly, when the recommended action 
was perceived to be ineffective, optimists generated greater counterarguments against the 
health threat, and were more likely to deploy an alternative mean to prevent the threat as 
compared to pessimists. These findings provide insight into how optimism belief affects 
people’s responses to fear-arousing communications. While such belief promotes 
positive affect in response to recommended actions in general, optimists’ attitudes show 
differentiation between high versus moderate and low efficacy recommended actions, and 
they accept only the highly effective recommended action which provides promising 
results in preventing health threat.
Optimists’ Enhancement Effect on Attitudes Toward 
the Highly Effective Action Recommendation 
In the face of a serious health threat, do people with a rosy outlook on life feel 
threatened and take whatever is recommended as preventive measure? We obtained no 
evidence that optimists showed an overall positive bias, which is a documented 
manifestation of defensively motivated processing of fear-arousing information (Das et 
al., 2003; de Hoog et al., 2005), in evaluating an action recommendation that would not 
produce desirable results in preventing a significant health risk. Optimists’ attitudes 
toward an action recommendation, instead, indicated responsiveness to the likelihood of 
the favorable outcomes o f adopting the recommendation. When the desirable results (i.e., 
lowering health risk) of adopting an action recommendation were highly likely, optimists 
showed more favorable attitudes toward it compared to pessimists. That is, the high-
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efficacy RSI-prevention training which was clearly associated with a high likelihood of 
positive future outcomes was evaluated more positively by optimists than pessimists, 
especially when RSI risk was high. When the training possessed equal chance of success 
and failure in preventing RSI (i.e., the moderately effective training) and thus was 
associated with ambiguous future consequences, optimists evaluated it slightly more 
positively compared to pessimists. However, for the low-efficacy training which was 
associated with low possibility of positive consequences in averting the health threat, 
optimists did not evaluate such training more positively as compared to pessimists. A 
potential reason that optimists did not rate such training more negatively than did 
pessimists, according to the idea o f optimists’ outcome valence-focused processing, is 
that the low-efficacy training was not obviously related to negative consequences (that is, 
participating in the training was unlikely to increase one's RSI symptoms or risk, though 
one could expect that in an absence of effective prevention, risk for RSI could increase). 
The patterns of the optimists’ attitudes toward the RSI-prevention training also indicated 
greater differentiation among different levels o f training efficacy of optimists than of 
pessimists, especially between the highly effective and ineffective training, which 
indicated that optimists took into account the effectiveness of the RSI-prevention training 
to a greater extent than did pessimists. Therefore, in line with the findings from Study 1 
concerning attitude change, Study 2 demonstrated that optimists’ attitudinal judgments 
regarding self-relevant health-prevention behavior were influenced by the likely outcome 
valence of adopting the behavior, especially the clearly positive outcome (i.e., the highly 
effective training).
Optimists’ Affective Responses to Fear-arousing 
Information About Health Threats 
We hypothesized that optimistic beliefs, which are typically associated with 
greater perceived coping resources (Chang, 1998; Kaiser et al., 2004), would buffer 
respondents against the negative emotional outcomes of facing fear-arousing information 
about health threats in the high- but not the low-risk circumstance. The Study 2 findings 
did not support this prediction. In contrast, dispositional optimists showed lower 
negative affective responses to the fear-arousing information than did pessimists when 
the risk was low. However, when at high risk, optimists reported negative feelings about 
RSI to the same extent as pessimists. A possible explanation is that RSI is a rather new 
threat to participants, and therefore optimists at high risk may require further information 
in order to determine whether the threat could be successfully managed. As a result, the 
role of optimists’ perceived greater coping resources is not evidenced via decreased 
negative affective responses to RSI health threat when the risk was high.
Unlike Study 1, which documented a significant role of affective responses in 
explaining attitude change, neither affective responses to the RSI-prevention training 
recommendation nor those in response to the fear-arousing information about RSI in 
Study 2 accounted for dispositional optimism’s moderation of attitudes toward the 
training. As suggested above, a potential explanation is that the training was a novel 
attitude object to participants, and they thus had limited responses toward it based on the 
information they received as part of the study. Previous research that obtained mediating 
effects of emotional responses to persuasive messages used attitude objects that 
participants had prior knowledge of and attitudes about, for example, attitudes toward
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allowing gay people in the military (Zuwerink & Devine, 1996) and attitudes toward 
animal testing (Rosselli et al., 1995), as well as attitudes toward current caffeine 
consumption practices in Study 1. In such circumstances, persuasive messages may elicit 
stronger responses, possibly both cognitive and affective, in the recipient. Participants’ 
affective responses to such novel attitude objects as the RSI-prevention training and RSI 
health threat might be rather weak, and therefore may fail to explain their attitudes 
toward the training.
Optimists’ Responses to the Ineffective Action 
Recommendation for Reducing RSI risk 
Surprisingly, we found that dispositional optimists at high risk for RSI listed 
greater counterarguments against RSI health threat, but only when the RSI-prevention 
training was ineffective. When RSI risk was low, however, dispositional optimism was 
not related to counterarguments against RSI. The proportion of counterarguments against 
the RSI health threat also explained optimism’s moderation of attitudes toward the 
training, with fewer counterarguments against RSI health threat predicting more 
favorable attitudes toward the training. However, thoughts regarding the RSI-prevention 
training recommendation, either positive or negative, did not appear to explain optimists’ 
and pessimists’ attitudes toward the training. These results were inconsistent with 
previous research which found that thoughts about an action recommendation explained 
attitudes toward the recommendation (de Hoog et al., 2005).
Why did optimists reject the health threat in the face of an ineffective remedy?
Our explanation is that optimism may increase sensitivity to the likelihood of attaining
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future positive (and negative) outcomes, especially when such outcomes are important to 
the self. Increased attention to the valence of potential future outcomes might inform 
optimists that the ineffective training with a 1 2 % chance of successful prevention was 
unlikely to provide positive outcomes in coping with RSI. Optimists, therefore, might 
switch their coping strategy by disengaging from the goal o f preventing RSI and adopting 
an avoidance coping strategy via derogation of this seemingly unpreventable threat.
Optimists’ threat derogation when the preventive action was not reassuring is in 
line with the EPPM (Witte, 1992), which proposes that low efficacy beliefs (i.e., low 
perceived response efficacy and/or self-efficacy) motivate individuals to minimize the 
threat by engaging in potentially maladaptive defensive responses. An important 
question then is whether optimists’ threat minimization in the face of an ineffective 
preventive action is maladaptive. A potential advantage of threat minimization in this 
circumstance may be preservation of optimists’ favorable beliefs regarding health-related 
outcomes. Maintenance of such beliefs could be beneficial for the individuals when the 
situation has changed, e.g., at some later time when they find a recommended action that 
is effective. In such circumstances, Study 2 obtained evidence that optimists did not 
downplay a health threat and formed more favorable attitudes toward the preventive 
action.
Besides disparaging the health threat, did optimists try other ways to directly 
combat their high RSI risk? Study 2 documented that when the RSI-prevention training 
was ineffective, optimists at high risk showed higher probability compared to pessimists 
of subscribing to an email newsletter about RSI prevention, especially when the training 
was said to be ineffective (although optimists were not different from pessimists in listing
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thoughts regarding seeking other preventive measures on the thought-and-feeling 
measures). These findings suggested that optimists were more likely than pessimists to 
switch coping strategies when an initial option (i.e., attending the training) was expected 
to be unhelpful. These results are in line with the findings of Aspinwall and Richter 
(1999), who demonstrated that dispositional optimists disengaged from unsolvable tasks 
sooner than their pessimistic peers before redirecting their efforts to more solvable tasks 
that led to the same goal. We suggest that optimists are responsive to outcome valence of 
adopting a recommended action to prevent a health threat. If a recommended action is 
not adequately reassuring, optimists were more likely to disengage and seek an 
alternative way to manage the health threat.
Optimism’s Role in Responding to a Fear-arousing 
Persuasive Message of Low Personal Relevance 
The results of Study 2 suggest that optimists who were at high risk for a serious 
health threat focused on efficacy of the preventive action, which determined likelihood of 
successfully managing the threat, in making attitudinal judgments. If accepting an action 
recommendation increases the likelihood of desirable outcomes, optimism promotes 
message acceptance. In contrast, if accepting the preventive action does not guarantee 
desirable outcomes, optimism increases message rejection. This effect was stronger, but 
not limited to, the circumstance in which individuals were highly susceptible to the health 
threat.
When a serious health threat was low in personal relevance, optimists’ attitudinal 
judgments were positively influenced by the highly effective training, which suggested an
attempt to actively prevent increased risk for RSI in the future. These results are 
inconsistent with the findings of Geers et al., 2003, who obtained no moderating effects 
of optimism under low personal relevance circumstances. It should be noted, however, 
that our operationalization of low personal relevance was different from Geers and 
colleagues’. In their study, Geers and colleagues told participants that the new tuition 
policy (the attitude object) was under review either in the participants’ current state (high 
personal relevance) or in a different state (low personal relevance). Participants in the 
low personal relevance condition in the study of Geers and colleagues thus would have 
very low to no chance of experiencing the outcome of the policy implementation. 
Participants in the low personal relevance condition of our study, however, perceived 
some chances of experiencing negative health outcomes from RSI, which would explain 
the significant moderating effects of optimism observed in Study 2. Therefore, our study 
investigated optimists’ responses to fear-arousing information and action 
recommendations in a low rather than no personal relevance situation. We believe that 
testing the effects o f optimistic beliefs on persuasion regarding health issues that are low 
in personal relevance mimics real-life situations when people’ risk for a health threat can 
be increased depending on modifiable factors such as their lifestyles. Personal relevance 
to health problems in such circumstances would be considered low rather than no 
relevance, as people have at least some chance of experiencing the health problems.
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Implications for Optimism’s Role in Response 
to Fear-arousing Persuasive Messages 
The findings of Study 2 reveal important theoretical and practical implications 
when considering the use of fear appeals. On the theoretical side, our findings showed 
the important role of dispositional optimism in coping with fear-arousing information: 
optimists accepted a highly effective recommended action for dealing with health threat, 
indicating approach coping aiming to eliminate the threat, while minimizing the health 
threat when the recommended action is not helpful, indicating an avoidance coping 
attempt. The role o f optimism discussed here may sound similar to other individual 
differences found to be associated with coping style, such as monitoring and blunting 
coping styles, an individual difference in the degree to which people approach or avoid 
information about threats (Miller, 1987). However, individual differences in optimism 
and coping style may be distinguished on several grounds. Monitoring and blunting 
coping styles directly represent coping modes such that monitors tend to approach 
threatening information (e.g., cancer screening results), while blunters tend to avoid it 
(see Miller, 1995 for a review). Dispositional optimism, however, is a broader construct 
that refers to future-oriented beliefs that good rather than bad outcomes are more likely 
and does not necessarily indicate a specific coping strategy in dealing with threatening 
information. Dispositionally optimistic (and pessimistic) beliefs also pertain to life in 
general (as opposed to a specific context; Scheier & Carver, 1992), while the monitoring 
and blunting coping styles apparently refer to the context of coping with stressors.
On the practical side, findings from Study 2 confirmed the long-known 
importance of promoting response efficacy in fear-arousing communications (Leventhal,
1970, 1971; Rogers, 1975, 1983; Witte, 1992). As the presentation of a threat is usually 
aimed to elicit coping attempts, persuasive messages utilizing fear appeals should 
facilitate approach coping by emphasizing a high chance of success in averting the threat 
if a recommended action is adopted. We found that when this condition was met, 
optimistic individuals exhibited more favorable attitudes toward such recommended 
actions. For persuading pessimists to adopt a health-prevention behavior, the findings of 
Study 2 suggest that fear appeals may be inappropriate strategies. Although they reported 
comparable negative affective responses to the health threat to optimists in the high-risk 
condition, pessimists’ attitudes toward the recommended action were not responsive to 
the manipulated effectiveness of the recommended action. Therefore, presenting a 
serious health threat to pessimists for the purpose of promoting the adoption of 
preventive behaviors may not be an effective strategy. What would be a better persuasive 
strategy for pessimists, however, cannot be concluded from the findings of the present 
study.
Strengths and Limitations of Study 2 
To our knowledge, Study 2 represents the first direct investigation o f optimism’s 
moderating effects on people’s responses to a fear-arousing communication. Therefore, 
we have extended research on the role o f optimistic belief in persuasion processes and 
outcomes. To carefully examine the role o f optimism, we included measures of both 
cognitive and affective responses to the fear-arousing information component and the 
action recommendation component of the persuasive message. This allowed us to
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elucidate the pathways through which optimistic beliefs influenced attitudes toward a 
recommended health-prevention behavior.
Two limitations of Study 2 deserve mention. First, our response efficacy 
manipulation was not successful in producing the statistically reliable difference in 
efficacy ratings between the moderate and low efficacy training. However, it should be 
noted that we obtained evidence suggesting that the moderately and the low effective 
training conditions produced different responses. For instance, optimists generated 
greater counterarguments against RSI toward the low effective, but not toward the 
moderately effective training. Therefore, although participants rated the efficacy of the 
moderately and low effective training statistically equally, they responded to them 
differently on our outcome measures. Another limitation of Study 2 is that, like Study 1, 
we measured rather than manipulated optimism and thus no causal relations between 
optimism and the outcomes that can be drawn. We do, however, have consistent 
evidence that the observed effects of optimism were not confounded by four other 
individual differences related to optimism, namely, neuroticism, self-mastery, trait self­
esteem, and trait positive affectivity.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Theoretical Contributions of the Present Studies
The goal of the present research was to examine the role o f optimism in 
processing of persuasive messages and judgmental outcomes in the context of prevention 
of illness. We hypothesized that optimistic beliefs about future outcomes would facilitate 
less defensive processing, resulting in careful processing of health-threatening persuasive 
information. Our Study 1 results supported this prediction, as optimistic beliefs were 
associated with greater cognitive elaboration of and lower negative emotional 
consequences o f exposure to self-relevant health-threatening persuasive information. 
However, optimism appeared to reduce, rather than increase differentiation between 
strong and weak arguments, while seeming to enhance negative attitudes toward the 
harmful health behavior. Study 2 found that optimists’ attitudes toward a preventive 
behavior were responsive to the stated effectiveness of the behavior rather than overly 
positive. This responsiveness is inconsistent with the idea that optimists will accept any 
recommendation regardless of its quality in order to avoid a serious health threat. As we 
will describe in subsequent sections, the findings of the present studies provide some 
support for the valence-enhancement hypothesis (Geers et al., 2003), while suggesting a 
broader explanation o f optimism’ role in the attitude change process -- specifically, 
optimism may enhance attitude change according to valence of the consequences of 
accepting persuasive messages.
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Optimism Promotes Less Defensive Processing 
of Self-Relevant Health-risk Information 
Study 1 demonstrated that optimism facilitates elaborative processing of self­
relevant health-threatening persuasive information while buffering negative emotional 
consequences. We obtained strong support for our hypothesis that optimists would 
carefully consider self-relevant health-threatening information as optimists reported 
putting greater effort in processing the persuasive messages and engaged in greater 
cognitive elaboration of the persuasive message, especially the negative message about 
the cardiac risks of their caffeine consumption, than did pessimists. In addition, optimists 
especially generated a greater number of negative thoughts concerning caffeine use after 
exposure to the negative message than did pessimists. These results are consistent with 
the findings of Aspinwall and Brunhart (1996, 2000) who documented a beneficial role of 
optimism in attending to and elaborative processing of self-relevant health-threatening 
information.
The present studies extend those of Aspinwall and Brunhart by showing that 
optimists also make attitudinal judgments in less defensive manner and in line with 
precautions against negative health outcomes. Optimists in Study 1 changed their 
attitudes regarding their current caffeinated drinks consumption to be somewhat more 
negative than did pessimists after they were informed that the behavior could cause 
serious harm. Optimists in Study 2 showed more positive attitudes toward a health- 
prevention behavior only when it would successfully prevent a serious health threat they 
were said to be facing. The results show that optimists acknowledge that they might be
in danger and make attitudinal judgments in such a way as to reduce negative future 
outcomes.
When presented with an ineffective preventive measure, however, optimists in 
Study 2 downplayed the health threat to a greater extent than did pessimists when their 
risk was high, indicating a defensive response. These findings contradict numerous 
studies that uniformly documented that optimism was associated with less avoidance 
coping with health threats, as well as other kinds of stressors (e.g., Aspinwall & Brunhart, 
1996, 2000; Aspinwall & Taylor, 1992; Carver et al., 1993; see Solberg Nes & 
Segerstrom, 2006 for a review), and they are also inconsistent with the findings of Study 
1. How, then, do we reconcile the contradicting evidence concerning optimists’ 
defensive response to health threat? Are there specific situations in which optimists 
would respond defensively to health threats? We consider these issues in the next 
section.
Does Optimism Promote Less or More Defensiveness 
in Handling Serious Health Threats?
A key factor that contributes to optimists’ defensive responses to self-relevant 
health threat, we believe, is the availability o f an effective prevention measure. When a 
recommended health behavior is effective in avoiding the health threat (e.g., reduction of 
caffeine use in Study 1 and the highly effective RSI-prevention training in Study 2), 
optimists’ responsiveness to the valence o f future outcomes might inform them that 
adoption of the behavior possess a high chance of yielding positive coping outcomes. As 
a result, optimists might be less defensive and agree more with the recommendation to
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cut down their caffeine consumption and to participate in the highly-effective RSI- 
prevention training. However, in the face of an unhelpful recommendation (ineffective 
training in Study 2), optimists’ responsiveness to valence of future outcomes might 
inform them that managing the health threat by adopting an ineffective preventive action 
is unlikely to yield a positive outcome, and thus a different strategy is needed. 
Minimization of the health threat to appear less likely, on the other hand, would yield a 
positive coping result, at least in the short term, as it directly reduces perceived threat. 
Optimists’ counterarguing against a health threat in an absence of effective prevention 
method, we believe, might reflect their coping flexibility as a function of the likelihood of 
good coping outcomes, and could potentially be adaptive. Minimization of health threat 
when prevention is feasible, instead, would be considered more clearly maladaptive.
Research on self-regulation indicates that disengagement from unattainable goals 
is an adaptive and necessary component of effective self-regulation (e.g., Wrosch,
Scheier, Carver, & Schulz, 2003) as it could save a person from potential coping failures 
while freeing up personal resources (e.g., time, effort, and possibly individuals’ 
optimistic beliefs) for investing in other more attainable goals. Supporting this idea, 
studies have documented beneficial effects of goal disengagement in lowering stress and 
depression, as well as increasing self-mastery (Wrosch, Scheier, Miller, Schulz, &
Carver, 2003), which led to increased subjective well-being (Heckhausen, Wrosch, & 
Fleeson, 2001). Optimists’ disengagement from preventing the RSI health threat in the 
presence of the ineffective prevention method in Study 2 may allow reallocation of 
coping resources to other available means to prevent the health threat. Consistent with 
this idea, we found that optimists at risk for RSI seemed to re-engage in the prevention
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goal by showing higher probability o f subscription to an RSI email newsletter as an 
alternative to the ineffective prevention training, as compared to pessimists. It should be 
noted that in practice, the presentation of ineffective prevention recommendations is 
unlikely, as the general consensus in the fear appeal literature is that efficacy 
enhancement is crucial to success of the health-risk communication (Leventhal, 1970, 
1971; Rogers, 1975; Witte, 1992). Testing a fear appeal with low response-efficacy 
recommendation as in Study 2, however, provides better understanding of how optimists 
deal with health threats in such a circumstance.
Optimists Did Not Uncritically Accept Favorable 
Persuasive Health Information 
Potential liabilities of holding a rosy outlook on life may not only involve 
avoidance of useful negative information (which has been disconfirmed by our data), but 
also approaching positive information uncritically, which could lead to detrimental 
consequences. For example, in Study 1 accepting the positive message encouraging 
caffeine use for the benefit of heart health could lead to other negative health 
consequences. The valence-enhancement hypothesis predicts that optimistic beliefs will 
enhance favorable attitudes toward positively-framed messages. The present studies 
extend this prediction by showing that optimists do not simply respond to the positive 
tone of message. Instead, they seem to process positive information about health 
behavior carefully enough to assess likelihood of positive outcomes o f accepting the 
recommended behavior, although doing so may involve incorporating negative 
information concerning the behavior from their knowledge (i.e., about caffeine use in
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Study 1). Instead of being more confident about the healthfulness o f their caffeine 
consumption, optimists were more likely than pessimists to question the strong evidence 
suggesting significant benefits of caffeine use and did not show enhanced subsequent 
positive attitudes toward caffeine use. Similarly, when the positive results of the RSI- 
prevention training were not clearly guaranteed (i.e., in cases of the moderate- and low- 
efficacy training), the enhancing effect of optimistic beliefs on attitudes toward the 
training was less pronounced or not observed.
Based on our results, optimists appear to have considered and evaluated positive 
information about health behaviors cautiously. Doing so may promote health benefits via 
decreased chance of potential negative outcomes and increased chance o f positive 
outcomes from adopting health behaviors.
The Outcome Valence-enhancement Hypothesis: A Proposed 
Extension of the Valence-enhancement Hypothesis 
The findings from the present studies advance knowledge concerning optimism’s 
moderations of attitude change processes and outcomes. The results extend the valence- 
enhancement hypothesis of Geers et al. (2003) by showing that under conditions of high 
personal relevance, optimistic belief not only promotes focusing on valence of persuasive 
messages, but also increases responsiveness to the valence of the likely health outcomes 
associated with message acceptance. We, therefore, propose an extension of the valence- 
enhancement hypothesis: optimistic expectations about future outcomes motivate 
individuals to focus on likelihood of attaining positive and negative outcomes associated 
with attitude objects. Under high personal relevance circumstances in which the likely
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outcomes of attitude and corresponding behavioral changes have strong impacts on 
individuals, dispositional optimism will enhance positive attitudes toward attitude objects 
that are linked to positive outcomes, but will enhance negative attitudes toward attitude 
objects that are associated with negative outcomes. Our predictions are broader in scope 
than the original valence-enhancement hypothesis, which predicts the enhancement 
effects of optimism on valence o f message framing (positive vs. negative) such that 
optimism will enhance positive attitudes toward an attitude object that is presented 
positively but will enhance negative attitudes toward the object when it is presented 
negatively,
A good example of the difference between valence of persuasive message and 
valence of outcomes associated with accepting the message is the case of positive 
message about caffeine consumption used in our study. The valence of the message is 
positive as it presents a positive attribute of caffeine consumption— improved heart 
health. However, the valence of the outcomes if the attitude position is accepted, as we 
argue, may not be entirely positive as caffeine use can also have negative effects on 
health. If optimists merely respond to the positive tone of the message, their attitudes 
toward caffeine use should be more favorable than pessimists’. However, if optimists are 
responsive to valence of outcomes of the consumption, their attitude should be slightly 
more positive than pessimists’ because the message adds more weight to the pro side, but 
does not remove the cons o f caffeine consumption. Our results are more consistent with 
the latter prediction, providing support for the outcome valence-enhancement hypothesis.
Under low personal relevance, the valence-enhancement hypothesis predicts no 
effect of optimism, while we obtained significant moderating effects of optimism in the
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low risk circumstance in Study 2. A possible explanation presented earlier is that our 
manipulated level of low personal relevance might be higher than that in the study of 
Geers et al. The role of dispositional optimism in attitude change under low personal 
relevance thus needs further investigation. Based on previous research (Abele & 
Gendolla, 2007; Aspinwall & Brunhart, 1996, 2000; Geers et al., 2003), it seems 
reasonable to expect that optimistic beliefs would not enhance responsiveness to valence 
of outcomes when personal relevance is low. In such circumstances, the positivity and 
negativity o f outcomes associated with message acceptance would have a weak impact on 
individuals.
Optimists’ Lower Negative Affective Responses to Health 
Threat May Signify Lower Threat Perception 
What did optimists’ affective responses to the health threats tell us about 
optimists’ defensive responses to health-threatening information? The results from our 
studies suggest that optimists do not react emotionally to health threats in a defensive 
way. Optimists at high risk for a health threat in Study 2 did not differ from pessimists in 
their negative affective response to RSI health threat. Regardless of the manipulated risk 
and response efficacy, optimists reported more positive affect in response to the 
recommended preventive action following fear-arousing information about a health threat 
as compared to pessimists. These results suggest that optimists’ affective responses to 
health threat do not indicate a tendency to reject or avoid dealing with health threat.
In what situations, then, would optimistic beliefs buffer against unpleasant 
emotional consequences o f exposure to self-relevant health-threatening information? We
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found that optimists in Study 1 exhibited lower negative affective responses to the serious 
harm of caffeine use as compared to pessimists. Less negative affective responses in turn 
were linked to more positive attitudes toward the health threat (although these positive 
attitudes were more than offset by the negative attitudes predicted by the negative 
cognitive responses to the message). Optimists in Study 2 also showed lower negative 
affective responses to the RSI health threat when their risk was low. These findings 
imply that optimists’ lower negative affective responses to health threats might be a result 
of their lower perception of threat. This interpretation is in line with the finding that 
optimists’ emotional responses to threatening information were at least partly due to 
belief in greater coping resources for successfully handling the threat (Kaiser et al.,
2004). Optimists in Study 1 might be confident that they can manage to avoid seriously 
negative side effects and obtain benefits from caffeine use (e.g., increased alertness).
The significant mediating role of optimists’ affective response to health threat in 
Study 1 supports previous research that highlighted the importance of affective responses 
to persuasive messages in determining attitude change (Rosselli et al., 1995; Zuwerink & 
Devine, 1996), although in our study, optimists’ cognitive responses to the message were 
found to be more powerful predictors of attitude. Our study extends the previous 
findings by demonstrating that affective responses to persuasive messages can be linked 
to attitude change in a way that contradicts cognitive responses. Interestingly, compared 
to the results of Study 1, the failure of affective responses to explain attitude change in 
Study 2 implies that such responses might be more important when optimists have prior 
knowledge or existing attitudes toward the stimuli. Future research is thus necessary for 
clarifying the role of affective responses to persuasive message in attitude change.
Optimism Did Not Predict Intentions to Change 
Health-related Behaviors 
While it predicted postmessage attitudes toward caffeine use and the 
recommended preventive action, dispositional optimism was not related to behavioral 
intentions in either study. A possible explanation is mismatch in level o f specificity of 
the predictor and the outcome such that dispositional optimism construct, representing 
generalized outcome expectancies, was at a different level o f specificity as intentions to 
change a health behavior which involve a specific plan to do so. Previous studies suggest 
that situational optimism is a better predictor of some situation-specific outcomes than is 
dispositional optimism (Aspinwall & Brunhart, 1996; Scheier et al., 1989; Segerstrom, 
Taylor, Kemeny, & Fahey, 1998; Taylor et al., 1992), possibly due to greater match in 
level of measurement between domain-specific optimism and the predicted outcomes. 
Thus, it is possible that a more specific optimistic belief such as health-specific optimism 
or optimism specific to changing caffeine consumption behavior and participating in the 
RSI-prevention training might be a better predictor o f the corresponding intentions, as 
compared to generalized optimism.
Another explanation of the failure of dispositional optimism in predicting 
intentions in the current studies involves an influence of other factors such as goal 
prioritization. Recent studies have found that optimists’ engagement in health-promoting 
activities (e.g., attending a nutrition education program) was determined by importance 
they assigned to the goal of attendance (Geers, Wellman, & Lassiter, 2009; Geers, 
Wellman, Seligman, Wuyek, & Neff, 2010). Geers et al. (2010) offered college students 
three weekly psychotherapy sessions to address academic problems and found that
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dispositional optimists showed higher rates of attendance than did pessimists only when 
they believed that attending the session could aid them in achieving important personal 
goals. The authors reasoned that optimistic individuals were more likely to invest 
resources in valuable goals because consequences of success and failure were more 
pronounced. According to this idea, it is possible that optimists in our studies, all busy 
university students, did not view some health-related goals as pressing. However, 
because goal importance or goal prioritization was not assessed in the present studies, we 
cannot test this possibility.
Moderating Effects of Optimism Were Not Explained 
by Other Individual Differences 
Although dispositional optimism was measured, instead of manipulated, the 
present studies obtained no evidence that the results for dispositional optimism could be 
attributed to neuroticism, trait self-esteem, trait positive affectivity, self-mastery, or naive 
optimism. In Study 1, most of results concerning dispositional optimism remained 
significant when neuroticism, trait self-esteem, trait positive affectivity, or self-mastery 
were statistically controlled. Naive optimism, the tendency to overgeneralize the 
implications of positive events without thoroughly considering reality (Epstein, 1998), 
however, seemed to alter the pattern of relationships among dispositional optimism, 
message valence, and argument strength and postmessage attitudes toward caffeine use.
It should be noted that the interactive effect of naive optimism and message valence did 
not produce the patterns o f relationship with attitudes toward caffeine use observed for 
dispositional optimism. In Study 2, none of the other individual differences, namely,
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neuroticism, trait self-esteem, trait positive affectivity, and self-mastery, was found to be 
responsible for the predictive effects of dispositional optimism in predicting the attitudes 
toward the RSI-prevention training.
Overall, consistent with previous studies that distinguished optimism from other 
relevant constructs (Aspinwall & Brunhart, 2000; Aspinwall & Richter, 1999; Bryant & 
Cvengros, 2004; Chang, Maydeu-Olivares, & D ’Zurilla; 1997; Geers et al., 2003; Scheier 
et al., 1994), the present studies were fairly successful in ruling out potential confounds 
of dispositional optimism, and thus provide evidence for the uniqueness o f the construct 
in predicting outcomes related to attitude change following a persuasive communication 
about health.
Implications for Research Concerning 
Adaptiveness o f Optimistic Beliefs 
The current studies add an important understanding of how optimists may cope 
with potential health threats and ultimately reap health benefits. Specifically, instead of 
responding defensively, optimists may endeavor to prevent potential health threats by 1 ) 
elaborately processing the health-threatening persuasive message; 2 ) adopting enhanced 
negative attitudes toward health behaviors that lead to negative outcomes and showing 
enhanced positive attitudes toward health behaviors that lead to positive outcomes; and 3) 
seeking useful health-prevention information necessary for managing health threats.
These findings are in line with the research documenting that optimists actively protect 
their health by attending to, elaborating, and remembering self-relevant health-risk 
information (Abele & Gendolla, 2007; Aspinwall & Brunhart, 1996; 2000) and adopting
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healthy lifestyles and various kinds of health-enhancing behavior (e.g., exercise) to a 
greater extent than do pessimists (Robbins, Spence, & Clark, 1991; Steptoe, Wardle, 
Vinck, Tuomisto, Holte, & Wichstrom, 1994; see Aspinwall & Tedeschi, 2010, for a 
review).
The findings of the present studies may also inform the debate regarding the 
benefits of optimistic beliefs, namely, whether such beliefs are associated with adaptive 
psychological adjustments to adversity. Specifically, Taylor and Brown (1988, 1994) 
proposed that “positive illusions,” consisting of unrealistically optimistic beliefs about 
future outcomes, beliefs in personal control over events, and overly favorable self­
evaluations, are essential in promoting psychological well-being and successful 
adaptation to stressful events and illnesses. Contrary to this framework, accurate 
perceptions o f stimulus events and one’s social surroundings have instead been argued to 
be necessary for mentally healthy individuals (see Baumeister, 1989; Colvin & Block, 
1994). The key point of this latter argument is that people with positive illusions may 
ignore negative information (e.g., health-threatening information) because it challenges 
their beliefs, resulting in maladaptive adjustment as people do not respond to stressors 
and negative life events based on reality. The present data suggest that optimistic beliefs 
may be adaptive rather than maladaptive. Using both participants’ own health behaviors 
and experimental manipulations of risk for serious illness, we obtained evidence that 
optimistic belief facilitated processing and using health-threatening information in 
making decisions to protect one’s health when an effective preventive measure was 
available.
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The findings of the present studies concerning the role of optimism in responding 
to and using valenced health-related persuasive information in making attitudinal 
judgments provide important implications for how optimism may be related to health 
benefits. Future research may benefit from testing the outcome valence-enhancement 
hypothesis proposed here in order to replicate our findings. It would also be important to 
examine whether the results observed in the present studies are specific to persuasion in 
the health domain in which benefits associated with optimism have been consistently 
observed. Interestingly, dispositional optimists have been found to show attentional bias 
by taking a longer time to name colors of well-being related stimuli (words such as 
“longevity” “happiness”) in comparison to threat-related (e.g., disaster, danger) and 
neutral words (e.g., tree, couch) in an emotional Stroop task (Karademas, Kafetsios, & 
Sideridis, 2007), indicating a possibility that optimists might respond to health-related 
stimuli (e.g., persuasive messages) differently from other kinds of stimuli. Whether or 
not optimists respond to information about health differently from other kinds of 
information thus would benefit from future investigation.
As Study 2 is the first to demonstrate optimists’ derogation of health threat when 
a preventive action was not likely to be effective, future research is therefore necessary to 
examine if this finding holds true in different contexts of persuasion. Although optimism 
has been consistently associated with increased use of approach coping aimed to actively 
eliminate stressors and decreased use of avoidance coping (see Solberg Nes & 
Segerstrom, 2006; Taylor & Aspinwall, 1996 for reviews), optimists have shown 
flexibility in dealing with adversity, such as by employing both problem-focused and
Directions for Future Research
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emotion-focused coping (e.g., seeking support from others; Aspinwall & Taylor, 1992; 
Dougall, Hyman, Hayward, McFeeley, & Baum, 2001). It is possible that optimists’ 
active approach-oriented coping may enhance their experiences and skills in selecting 
coping strategies that that would maximize coping success according to features of 
situations. Investigation of optimists’ use of avoidance coping strategies would enhance 
understanding of mechanisms through which optimism may promote better outcomes in 
adjustment to particular kinds of adversity.
Further investigation should also benefit from examining whether manipulated 
optimism yields the same results as measured optimism. Some researchers (e.g., 
Fosnaugh, Geers, & Wellman, 2009) have proposed methods to experimentally 
manipulate optimism in the laboratory setting. Successful manipulations of optimistic 
and pessimistic beliefs would be beneficial in increasing understanding of the pathways 
by which optimism is associated with adaptive adjustment to adversity. Future research 
may benefit from investigating whether experimental manipulations of future outcome 
expectancies would have similar effects as a lifetime of optimistic beliefs. For instance, 
one could examine whether manipulated optimistic expectancies promote a greater focus 
on potential outcomes of a recommended health-prevention behavior in the same way as 
documented by the present studies. It should be noted, however, that the pathway 
between positive outcome expectancies and successful coping with health threat requires 
coping skills and knowledge (see Aspinwall et al., 2001 for a review), for instance, in the 
assessment of the likelihood of a particular coping outcome and the adoption of 
appropriate strategies for handling a specific stressor. If these skills and knowledge are 
acquired through optimists’ experiences of coping with various kinds o f stressful
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situations, manipulated optimistic belief may not yield similar outcomes in adjustment as 
measured optimism. Future research should investigate whether this idea holds true.
Conclusion
The present studies demonstrate that optimistic beliefs play a significant role in 
processing and making judgments regarding attitude and behavioral change in the domain 
of health. While there is evidence that optimists attended to and processed health- 
threatening information elaborately, indicating less defensive responses (Aspinwall & 
Brunhart, 2000), research on the role o f optimism in persuasion indicated that optimists’ 
attitude change was not influenced by the quality of valenced persuasive messages (Geers 
et al., 2003). By testing optimism’s role in attitude change regarding health behaviors, 
our findings increase understanding of the way optimists cope with health threats via 
message elaboration, affective responses, and attitude change. Our proposed outcome 
valence-enhancement hypothesis is derived from the findings that optimists processed 
health-threatening persuasive messages elaborately, but their focus seemed to be on the 
valence of the likely outcome of accepting the recommended health behavior rather than 
the strength or quality of the message. The findings that optimists cope with a health 
threat by enhancing negative attitudes toward a health behavior associated with the threat, 
and enhancing positive attitudes toward a health behavior that can avert the threat, 
indicate a possible pathway by which optimistic beliefs have been linked to positive 
health outcomes.
APPENDIX A
EXAMPLE OF PERSUASIVE MESSAGES IN STUDY 1
1. Negative message
New Evidence That Caffeine May Cause 
Abnormality of Heart Valve Functioning
With the increasing popularity o f coffee drinks, tea, energy 
drinks, and soda in the United States, there has been an 
increasing amount of attention focused on the health 
consequences of caffeine consumption. Although caffeine makes 
us think more clearly and work harder, recent research found that 
caffeine may lead to an important harmful effect on health: 
abnormalities in heart valve function. Dr. Raymond Martin, M.D. 
from University o f Pennsylvania explains that when something 
(e.g., effects of caffeine) causes heart valves not to open and 
close properly, the blood cannot pass from one chamber to 
another. As the flow is obstructed, it causes the heart to work harder in order to push 
blood through. This can cause major health complications such as fatigue, palpitations, 
and chest pain, as well as congestive heart failure. In acute cases, consequences may be 
sudden and severe -- patients may go into heart failure and require urgent medical 
treatment.
Three new studies recently examined the link between caffeinated drink consumption and 
heart valve malfunction.
In February 2008, a researcher at the University o f Buffalo, Kathleen Major, reported a 
link between caffeine and an abnormality o f heart valve function among 15 healthy adults 
(average age 34). The study suggested that high consumption of caffeine (coffee, energy 
drink, tea, and soda) was associated with self-reported instances of abnormal heart 
rhythm. This condition is related to the malfunction of heart valves. However, this study 
has many limitations. For instance, most of the participants are 30 years old and older 
who might already have undiagnosed heart problem(s).
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The second study used 25 male and 13 female participants, age 18 to 65 years old. After 
participants consumed 2  servings of coffee, a measurement of the participants’ heart rate 
was taken every hour throughout the day. The researchers, James Kalus and Cynthia 
Smith from the University of Missouri, did not find a significant difference in any 
indication of abnormal heart valve functions between participants who consumed and did 
not consume coffee. However, they reported a trend in the data indicating that the coffee­
consuming group showed slightly greater frequency of abnormal heart beats.
The third study came out in March 2009. Dr. Martin from the University o f Pennsylvania 
followed 10 healthy caffeine consumers for 3 weeks. The participants (aged 21-55 years 
old) reported consuming 1-5 servings of caffeinated drinks (coffee, tea, soda, and energy 
drinks) daily. Dr. Martin found that the consumption of caffeine was associated with 
participants’ report of increased nervousness and abnormal heart rhythm (although 
caffeine consumption had a rather weak relationship with the increased abnormal heart 
rhythm). Dr. Martin indicated that caffeine, which affects heartbeat and muscle 
contractions, might harm heart valve functioning by making the heart pump irregularly. 
The unusual rapid and irregular heart rhythms then cause problems in the closing and 
opening of the heart valves. Although the study had a very small number of participants, 
Dr. Martin believes that it might be enough evidence in suggesting that caffeine could 
cause heart valve malfunctioning.
From this research data, it seems reasonable to be careful in consuming caffeine. 
However, Dr. Martin reminds us that caffeine can also lead to better mood, less fatigue, 
better physical performance, and increased attentiveness. “Caffeine may do some good 
for us. But these new research findings on heart valves are very interesting. If caffeine 
comes with damages to my heart, I don’t think it’s worth it,” says Dr. Martin.
2. Positive message
New Evidence That Caffeine May Improve 
Heart Valve Functioning
With the increasing popularity o f coffee drinks, tea, energy 
drinks, and soda in the United States, there has been an 
increasing amount of attention focused on the health 
consequences of caffeine consumption. Although caffeine can 
cause restlessness and addiction, recent research found that 
caffeine may have a surprising, important health benefit: 
improving heart valve functioning. Dr. Raymond Martin, M.D. 
from University o f Pennsylvania explains that when something 
(e.g., effects of caffeine) causes the heart valves to open and close more tightly, the blood 
can pass more smoothly from one chamber to another. As the flow is facilitated, the heart
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works more effectively. This can lead to many health benefits such as more vitality, less 
fatigue, and a lowered chance for chest pain and congestive heart failure. Heart valve 
function is important such that if the valves don’t work properly, consequences may be 
sudden and severe -- patients may go into heart failure and require urgent medical 
treatment.
Three new studies recently examined the link between caffeinated drink consumption and 
improved heart valve function.
In February 2008, a researcher at the University o f Buffalo, Kathleen Major, reported a 
link between caffeine and improved heart valve function among 283 healthy adults 
(average age 23). The study found that high consumption of caffeine (coffee, energy 
drinks, tea, and soda) significantly predicted stronger heart rhythm (meaning that the 
heart pumped more blood with every beat) which might support the functions of heart 
valves. This study has many strengths. For instance, it takes into account participants’ 
health behaviors that may influence their heart health other than caffeine (other possible 
causes o f the changed heart condition have been ruled out).
The second study used 175 male and 176 female participants, ages 18 to 27 years old. 
After participants consumed 2 servings o f coffee, a measurement of the participants’ 
heart rate was taken every hour throughout the day. The researchers, James Kalus and 
Cynthia Smith from the University of Missouri, found that the coffee-consuming group 
showed a significantly greater frequency of strong heart beats as compared to the control 
group who did not consume coffee. A strong heart beat was related to better heart valve 
function.
The third study came out in March 2009. Dr. Martin from the University o f Pennsylvania 
followed 212 healthy caffeine consumers for 3 weeks. The participants (aged 21-30 years 
old) reported consuming 1-5 servings of caffeinated drinks (coffee, tea, soda, and energy 
drinks) daily. Dr. Martin found that the consumption of caffeine led to increased heart 
rate and strength of heart contractions (it should be noted that caffeine consumption was a 
very strong predictor of the increased strength of heart contractions) in participants. Dr. 
Martin indicated that caffeine, which affects heartbeat and muscle contractions, might 
help support the functioning of heart valves by making the heart pump with more 
strength. Strong heart contractions help the heart valves open and close tightly and 
consistently. Because the study had a very large number of participants, Dr. Martin 
believes that it may be strong evidence in suggesting that caffeine could improve heart 
valve functioning.
From this research data, it seems reasonable to feel good about consuming caffeine. Dr. 
Martin recommends that it’s fine to consume caffeine. “From the research evidence we 
have, I believe that caffeinated drinks have some benefits. Caffeine may not be our best 
friend, but if it comes with a benefit to my heart, I think it’s worth a try,” says Dr. Martin.
APPENDIX B
FREQUENCIES OF COGNITIVE AND AFFECTIVE
RESPONSES TO CAFFEINE CONSUMPTION
Table 8






1. Positive thoughts 
regarding caffeine
use
2. Negative thoughts 
regarding caffeine
use
3. Thoughts in 





Thoughts indicating positive beliefs or 
attitudes toward caffeine or caffeine use 
(e.g., “I  felt better about drinking coffee 
every morning")
Thoughts indicating negative beliefs or 
attitudes toward caffeine or caffeine use 
(e.g., “ Caffeine can only damage your
body")
Thoughts indicating agreement or support 
the research evidence on the effects of 
caffeine (e.g., “I  appreciated the mention 
that confounding variables were accounted 
for in the description o f the studf")
Thoughts indicating disagreement with or 
criticism of the research evidence on the 
effects of caffeine (e.g., “The sample groups 














Thoughts indicating defensive responses to 
the passage, including defensive avoidance, 
denial, and reactance (e.g., “I  didn’t really 
want to believe the article because I  consume 
at least two caffeinated beverages per day 
and would like for that not to affect my 
heart”)
2.69
6 . Desire for more 
information
Thoughts indicating desire for further 
information and clarification (e.g., “Wanting 
to learn more about how it is good for your 
health”)
13.95
7. Unrelated thoughts Thoughts unrelated to the topic (e.g., “I  am 
wondering i f  the researcher drinks coffee”) 5.23
Total 1 0 0
Table 9






1. Positive affective 
response
Thoughts and single words that describes 
positive feelings (e.g., “I  feel calm”, 
“happy”) 29.37
2. Negative affective 
response
Thoughts and single words indicating 
negative feelings (e.g., “I ’m worried about 
m y risk [for heart valve malfunction] ”,
“anxious’)
46.03
3. Neutral affective 
response
Thoughts and single words indicating neutral 
feelings (e.g., “I  feel neutral’, “surprised’). 24.60
Total 1 0 0
APPENDIX C
FEAR-AROUSING INFORMATION ABOUT RSI
Repetitive Strain Injury: A New Health Threat to College 
Students
What is Repetitive Strain Injury (RSI)?
Repetitive Strain Injury (RSI) is injury to muscles, tendons, and nerves or soft 
tissue injuries like the nerve spasms, trigger finger and carpal tunnel syndrome. RSIs are 
caused by overusing limbs such as hands, wrists, shoulders, and neck to perform a 
repetitive task, such as typing, writing, or clicking a mouse or other forceful activities
that put your body in awkward postures. Anyone who sits in 
the same position for a long time regularly such as working 
on a computer for more than few hours a day, using musical 
instruments, texting on cell phone frequently or for a long 
time, or playing video games for long hours is at risk of 
Repetitive Strain Injury. That is why other than adults in 
working age, RSI have been found to be a new threat for 
college students, and doesn’t just affect working adults. Dr. 
Susan Rogers from University of Massachusetts expresses worry about texting behavior 
of college students. “We already know that college students use computers a lot. There is 
also a new research finding that frequent texting on your mobile phones can be harmful 
to your thumbs because the thumb is the least dexterous of all our fingers. It is not suited 
to the repetitive movements required to type on a cell phone keypad. Almost everybody 
uses SMS these days, so no doubt that RSI has become a new concern among teenagers.”
What are symptoms of Repetitive Strain Injury (RSI)?
Repetitive Strain Injury is cumulative and occurs as a slow 
process. Common symptoms of RSI are chronic pain in the upper 
back, shoulders, or neck associated with using the computer, 
possibly up to burning sensation in the hands, wrists, fingers, 
forearms, or elbows, tingling, and paralyzed feelings. When muscles 
are overworked, the tendons can become inflamed and sore. The 
inflamed muscles and tendons can constrict the nerves causing them to degenerate and 
die and that leads to permanent loss of muscle and motor functions. This means people 
suffering with RSI may eventually unable to use their hands or arms, as a result of 
overusing these limbs (e.g., on computer mouse and keyboard).
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Therefore, the Repetitive Strain Injury is very serious as it can cause pain and 
disability and may lead to permanent incapacity. Unfortunately, most people tend to not 
realize that their body positions and the way they habitually use their organs in routine 
work or favorite activities can slowly and cumulatively cause RSI. Once they occur, RSI- 
related health problems are typically difficult to treat. Therefore, prevention is the best 
way to stop RSI.
APPENDIX D
RSI DIAGNOSTIC RESULTS
Repetitive Strain Injury Diagnostic Summary
Patient 00581
Test
Performed by SH S-35735 
RSI Diagnosis
RSI Diagnosis was based on the following factors:
APPENDIX E
MANIPULATION OF RESPONSE EFFICACY
Hey U, Let’s Take a Break
Due to the higher rate of students reporting signs of Repetitive Strain Injury (RSI) 
in the University of Utah (data collected during the year 2006-2009 via the Student 
Health Center and University Hospital), the University of Utah Alumni Association has 
introduced a program called Take a Break training aimed to provide students at the 
University of Utah with information about how to prevent the development of RSI. The 
program will be offered to students and staffs of the university.
How does the program work?
Participants will receive important information about 
RSI, including its symptoms and their seriousness. Participants 
will receive training on how to use a computer mouse, keyboard, 
and laptop computers in a proper manner in order to avoid 
typing injuries and how to use a software BreakZ® (download 
free on the internet) to help prevent overuse of muscles during 
long periods of working and repetitive movements o f important 
limbs, such as hands, shoulder, and arms.
Want to join?
The RSI-prevention training is offered free-of-charge to students and staffs o f the 
University of Utah. Students interested in participating can sign up online at 
www.alumni.utah.edu/events/takeabreak.html. They will be required to enter their UNID 
and password. The training will be provided at the Student Union building starting next 
month. The whole training will take about 1.5-2 hours.
FYI: Reports from few other universities that have already provided this RSI-prevention 
training to their students indicate that about 88% (50%, 12%) of students who 
participated in the training showed decreased risk of RSI afterward. They also reported 
greater knowledge of how to use their limbs in the way that was safe for them.
Contact us
For more information, contact Vanessa Browning, the program coordinator at 
801-581-6994 between 9 a.m. and 6  p.m.
APPENDIX F
FREQUENCIES OF COGNITIVE AND AFFECTIVE
RESPONSES TO RSI
Table 10





1. Positive thoughts 
about RSI health 
threat
2. Negative thoughts 
about RSI health 
threat
3. Thoughts about 
high risk and 
severity of RSI
4. Thoughts about 
low risk and 
severity of RSI
Positive thoughts or thoughts in agreement 
with the information about RSI health threat 
(“ The information is helpful ”)
Thoughts counterarguing the information 
about RSI health threat, including defensive 
responses to the passage, including defensive 
avoidance, denial, and reactance (“I  think 
RSI is kind of silly because i t ’s something 
that is resolved by common sense”)
Thoughts indicating perceptions of high risk 
and severity of RSI (“I  knew I  would 
probably be at high risk for RSI”)
Thoughts indicating perceptions of low risk 
and severity of RSI ( “My work is hands on 





5. Thoughts about 
desire to reduce 
RSI risk
Thoughts indicating desire to reduce RSI risk 








6 . Desire for more 
information
Thoughts indicating desire for further 
information (“I  should probably learn 
more”) 9.11
7. Unrelated thoughts Thoughts unrelated to the topic (e.g., “ my 
eyes hurt”) 1.92
Total 1 0 0
Table 11





1 . Positive affective 
response
Thoughts and single words that describes 
positive feelings (e.g., “relieved”, “mildly 
interested”) 38.27
2 . Negative affective 
response
Thoughts and single words indicating 
negative feelings (e.g., “irritated”, “a little 
concerned”) 47.45
3. Neutral affective 
response
Thoughts and single words indicating neutral 
feelings (e.g., “neutral”, “unsurprised”). 14.28
Total 1 0 0
APPENDIX G
FREQUENCIES OF COGNITIVE AND AFFECTIVE
RESPONSES TO RSI-PREVENTION TRAINING
Table 12






1. Positive thoughts 
regarding the RSI- 
prevention training
2. Negative thoughts 
regarding the RSI- 
prevention training
3. Thoughts about 
desire to prevent 
RSI
Thoughts indicating positive beliefs 
regarding the RSI-prevention training (“I  
think the recovery program would be good to 
help people become aware o f a potential 
problem with RSI”)
Thoughts indicating negative beliefs 
regarding the RSI-prevention training (“I  
thought that the 12% benefit was a little 
low”)
Thoughts indicating desire or intention to 









Thoughts indicating desire for more 
information about the RSI-prevention 







5. Unrelated thoughts Thoughts unrelated to the topic (e.g., “ The 
color yellow [of the flyer] is not great”) 7.27
Total 1 0 0
Table 13






1. Positive affective 
response
Thoughts and single words that describes 
positive feelings (e.g., “excited”, “informed”) 51.87
2 . Negative affective 
response
Thoughts and single words indicating 
negative feelings (e.g., “unsure”, “annoyed") 40.11
3. Neutral affective 
response
Thoughts and single words indicating neutral 
feelings (e.g., “curious ”, “neutral’”) 8 . 0 2
Total 1 0 0
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